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1. Introduction 
Labor markets perform quite differently  across countries.  An often cited 
example  is the  sharp contrast  in unemployment  rates between  Europe 
and  the  United  States.  There  are  large  and  persistent  differences  in 
labor-market policies  as well.1 The goal of this paper is to explore to what 
extent  differences  in  labor market  policies  can  generate  differences  in 
labor-market performance.  In particular, the paper builds a general equi- 
librium  model  to  evaluate  the  aggregate  effects  and  welfare  conse- 
quences  of  a variety  of  labor-market  policies  and  institutions,  mainly 
minimum  wages,  firing  restrictions,  unemployment  insurance,  and 
unions.  The  model  embodies  a  McCall  search  model  in  a  general- 
equilibrium  production  economy  by  modifying  Lucas  and  Prescott's 
(1974)  island  model  to  incorporate  undirected  search  and  out-of-the- 
labor-force participation. 
Production  takes place  in a large number  of separate locations  called 
islands,  which  use  labor  as  an  input  of  production  in  a  decreasing- 
returns-to-scale  technology.  In each island  there  are a fixed  number  of 
firms  which  share  a common  productivity  shock.  Productivity  shocks 
follow  a Markov process,  and are identically  and independently  distrib- 
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1. This has been  documented  in a number  of OECD Jobs Studies  and surveyed  and ana- 
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uted  across islands.  At the beginning  of a period,  there is a given  distri- 
bution  of agents  across islands.  After shocks  are realized,  agents  decide 
whether  to  leave  their islands  and  become  nonemployed,  or stay  and 
work. Nonemployed  agents  must decide  whether  to search or engage  in 
home  production.  If an agent  searches,  he  is randomly  assigned  to an 
island the following  period.  In this sense  search is undirected. 
Labor markets are competitive  within  each island: firms and workers 
take the process  for spot wages  as given.  We also assume  that firms and 
workers  have  access  to a complete  set  of state-contingent  securities  in- 
dexed by the shocks to each island. Given this market structure, workers 
and firms maximize  the expected  discounted  value of their earnings.  The 
model  abstracts  from  any  insurance  role  of  labor-market  policies.  In 
Alvarez  and  Veracierto  (1998) we  analyzed  unemployment  insurance 
and severance  payments  in a model  with incomplete  markets and found 
that the insurance  role of these  policies  was  quantitatively  very  small.2 
Their welfare implications  were dominated  by their effects on productiv- 
ity, search  decisions,  and  firm dynamics.  Those  findings  motivate  our 
current assumption  of complete  markets; it considerably  simplifies  the 
analysis,  allowing  us to analyze  a richer set of policies  while  still captur- 
ing most  of the effects  of these  policies. 
The  model  is  general  equilibrium  in  the  sense  that:  (1)  wages  are 
consistent  with  market  clearing  in  each  island,  (2) the  cross-sectional 
distribution  of employment  and wages  is endogenous,  (3) the endoge- 
nous  distribution  of wages  across  islands  is consistent  with  the  incen- 
tives  to  search,  and  (4) aggregate  employment  is  consistent  with  the 
number  of workers  that search and the aggregate  labor supply. 
The model  is closely  related  to two  strands  in the  literature.  First, it 
incorporates  important  elements  of industry  equilibrium  models  where 
the job creation and destruction  process  is determined  by changes  in the 
labor demand  of  firms.  Examples  of these  models  include  Bertola and 
Caballero (1994), Bentolila and Bertola (1990), Hopenhayn  and Rogerson 
(1993),  Campbell  and  Fisher  (1996),  and  Veracierto  (1995).  Second,  it 
incorporates  features  of standard  search models  where  the job creation 
and destruction  process  is determined  by the accept-reject  decisions  of 
workers.  Examples  of  these  models  include  McCall (1970), Mortensen 
(1986), Wolpin  (1987), and Lundqvist  and Sargent (1998). 
Industry  equilibrium  models  (e.g.,  Hopenhayn  and Rogerson  (1993)) 
have  typically  abstracted  from  unemployment  decisions,  focusing 
on  the employment-nonemployment  decision.  Most  equilibrium  mod- 
els  of  unemployment  that  have  been  used  for  policy  analysis  (e.g., 
2. Also  see Costain  (1997), Hansen  and Imrohoroglu  (1992), and Valdivia (1996). Labor-Market  Policies  in an Equilibrium  Search  Model  * 267 
Millard and  Mortensen  (1997)) have  abstracted  from the  employment- 
nonemployment  decision  and  studied  production  units  that consist  of 
single  workers.  The model  in this paper incorporates  all three margins: 
(1)  the  employment  decision  of  firms,  which  allows  to  study  firms 
dynamics;  (2) home  vs.  market production  decisions,  which  allows  us 
to  analyze  labor-force  participation;  and  (3)  the  search  decisions  of 
workers,  which  allows  us  to study  unemployment.3  In fact, the  labor- 
market policies  that we  analyze  will  have  important  consequences  for 
all of these  margins. 
We start by considering  a laissez-faire  regime. Since this is an economy 
where  the  laissez-faire  equilibrium  is  efficient  (despite  the  search  fric- 
tions),  we use it as a benchmark  when  comparing  the effects of different 
policies.  We show  how  to  modify  the  basic  environment  to  introduce 
minimum  wages,  unions,  firing taxes,  and  unemployment  benefits.  In 
all  cases,  we  consider  stationary  equilibria  only.  We  select  parameter 
values  by matching  model  moments  with  selected  U.S. statistics under a 
stylized  version  of U.S.  policies. 
Minimum  wages  are introduced  as in textbook analyses: if equilibrium 
wages  in a given  island are lower than the minimum  wage,  jobs must be 
rationed  in some  way until wages  equal the minimum  wage.  We experi- 
ment  with  different  ways  of  rationing  the  supply  of  workers.  For in- 
stance,  we  allow  for a distinction  between  "insiders"  and  "outsiders." 
We  find  that  the  aggregate  effects  of  minimum  wages  are extremely 
small in all the cases. 
We introduce  unions,  by assuming  that the workers  in a certain frac- 
tion of the islands  sector are unionized.  As in textbook analyses,  unions 
restrict employment  in order to increase total wage earnings.  As a conse- 
quence,  unionized  islands  generate  higher  unemployment  rates  than 
competitive  islands.  We consider two models  of unions,  with quite differ- 
ent implications.  In one version,  a union  is consistituted  by the coalition 
of all workers  present  in the island  at a given  period  of time.  The work- 
ers  collude  to  extract rents  from  the  fixed  factor, sharing  the  benefits 
equally  among themselves.  In the other version,  the union  is dominated 
by a "union boss"  who  appropriates  all the rents from the fixed factor, 
and  pays  workers  their opportunity  cost.  We find  that in the  coalition 
model  of unions,  higher degrees  of unionization  increase the unemploy- 
ment  rate and  decrease  welfare  levels  substantially.  This is due  to the 
incentives  to search for a unionized  island  in order to appropriate rents. 
3. On the other hand,  our model  abstracts from entry and exit and from any search done 
by firms, two margins that have been  analyzed  in previous  studies. 268 *  ALVAREZ  & VERACIERTO 
The rationing  of employment  in unionized  islands  contributes  to larger 
flows  into unemployment  as well. 
Following  Bentolila and Bertola (1990) and Hopenhayn  and Rogerson 
(1993), we  introduce  firing  restrictions  as a tax on  employment  reduc- 
tions.  This tax makes  the  firms' employment  decisions  dynamic,  since 
increasing  current  employment  exposes  firms  to  future  firing  costs. 
Firms react to  the  firing  taxes  by  firing  and  hiring  workers  less  often, 
leading  to  higher  unemployment  duration  and  lower  unemployment 
incidence.  Under  our parametrization,  the  decrease  in unemployment 
incidence  dominates  the increase  in unemployment  duration.  As a con- 
sequence,  firing  taxes  reduce  the  unemployment  rate in the  economy. 
Similarly to previous  studies,  we  find that firing taxes equivalent  to one 
year of wages  have large negative  welfare  effects.  However,  firing taxes 
of  similar  magnitudes  to  the  severance  payments  observed  in  OECD 
countries produce  relatively  small negative  effects. 
Finally, we model  unemployment  insurance  (UI) benefits  as payments 
that accrue to workers  after a job separation.  In our model,  unemploy- 
ment  benefits  have  similar  effects  to  firing  subsidies.4  In  particular, 
agents  choose  to stay out of the labor force and not search as long as they 
are eligible for UI benefits.  We find that UI benefits  have large effects on 
unemployment  rates, since they increase both the duration  and the inci- 
dence  of unemployment.  For instance,  doubling  the present  value  of UI 
benefits  (from U.S.  values)  increases  unemployment  rates by about 1%. 
Our  quantitative  analysis  indicates  that  the  responses  of  the  unem- 
ployment  rate  and  employment  to  changes  in  UI benefits,  degree  of 
unionization,  minimum  wages,  and  firing taxes  are broadly  consistent 
with  estimates  in  the  empirical  literature  (Nickell,  1977,  for example). 
This provides  some  confidence  about  the  structure  of our model  econ- 
omy and the welfare  results obtained. 
The paper  is organized  as follows.  Section  2 describes  the  economy. 
Section  3  describes  the  laissez-faire  equilibrium.  Section  4  introduces 
different policies/institutions  into the basic model.  Section 5 explains  our 
choice of parameter values.  Section 6 describes the effects of the different 
policies  in  the  calibrated  economy.  Finally,  Section  7  compares  these 
effects with estimates  provided  by the empirical literature. 
2.  The  Economy 
The economy  is populated  by a measure  one  of ex ante identical  agents 
with  preferences  given  by 
4. In fact, they are completely  equivalent  when  the UI benefits  are small. Labor-Market  Policies  in an Equilibrium  Search  Model  ?  269 
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where  ct is  consumption  of  market  goods,  ht is  consumption  of home 
goods,  y  0, and 0 <  3 <  1. 
The market good  is produced  in a continuum  of islands.  Each island 
has a production  technology  given by 
Yt =  F(g,Zt)  ztgt, 
where  Yt  is output,  gt is the labor input,  zt is an idiosyncratic productivity 
shock,  and 0 <  a <  1. The productivity  shock zt evolves  according to the 
following  AR(1) process: 
In zt,  = a +  p In zt +  et+1, 
where  Et+ ~- N(0,cr2) and 0 <  p <  1. Realization  of zt are assumed  to be 
independent  across islands.  Throughout  the paper we will refer to Q as 
the corresponding  transaction function for zt, and tof(gt,zt)  = aF(gt,zt)/agt 
as the marginal productivity  of labor. 
Home  goods  are produced  in  a nonmarket  activity  which  requires 
labor as an input  of production.  If an agent  spends  a period  of time at 
home,  he obtains wh  units of the home  good.  Home  and market activities 
are mutually  exclusive:  agents  cannot  engage  in both  at the same  time. 
At the beginning  of every period there is a given  distribution  of agents 
across islands.  An island  cannot  employ  more than the total number  of 
agents  xt present in the island  at the beginning  of the period.  If an agent 
stays in the island  in which  he is currently located,  he produces  market 
goods  and starts the following  period  in that same  location.  Otherwise, 
the agent leaves  the island  and becomes  nonemployed. 
A nonemployed  agent has two alternatives.  First, he can leave the labor 
force and engage  in home  production  during  the current period.  In this 
case,  the following  period  the agent will remain nonemployed.  The sec- 
ond  alternative is to search.  If the agent  searches,  he obtains zero home 
production  during the current period, but becomes  randomly  assigned  to 
an island  at the beginning  of the following  period.  A key feature of the 
search technology  is that agents have no control over which  island  they 
will be assigned  to,  i.e.,  search is undirected.  In particular, we  assume 
that searchers arrive uniformly  across all islands  in the economy. 
Hereafter, we refer to agents doing home  production  as being out of the 270 *  ALVAREZ  & VERACIERTO 
labor  force, agents  working  in the islands  sector as employed, and  agents 
searching  as unemployed. 
We now  describe  feasibility  for  stationary  allocations.5  An  island  is 
indexed  by  its  current productivity  shock  z and  the  total number  of x 
agents  available at the beginning  of the period.  Feasibility  requires that 
the  island's  employment  level,  denoted  by  g(x,z),  cannot  exceed  the 
number  of agents  initially available: 
g(x,z)  < x. 
The number  of  agents  in  the  island  at the  beginning  of  the  following 
period,  denoted  by x', is given by 
x' =  U + g(x,z), 
where  U is total unemployment  in the economy.  Note  that this equation 
uses  the  fact  that  unemployed  agents  become  uniformly  distributed 
across all islands  in the economy. 
The  law  of  motion  for x and  the  Markov  process  for z generate  an 
invariant distribution  ,u which  satisfies 
,u(X',Z') =  f  Q(z,Z')jL(dx x  dz) 
(x,z):  g(x,z) +  U e X } 
for all X' and  Z'.  This equation  states  that the  total number  of islands 
with  a number of agents in the set X' and a productivity  shock in the set 
Z' is given by the sum of all islands  that transit from their current shocks 
to a shock  in Z'  and  chose  an employment  level  such  that x' is in X'. 
Aggregate  employment  N is then  given  by 
N =  g(x,z),u(dx x  dz), 
and aggregate  consumption  by 
c = f F(g(xz),,z)p(dx  x dz). 
Both expressions  are obtained  by adding  the corresponding  magnitudes 
across all islands  in the economy. 
5. Since  our  analysis  will  focus  on  steady-state  equilibria,  we  restrict our  discussion  of 
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Finally, the number  of agents  that stay out of the labor force cannot be 
negative: 
1 -  U-N'O. 
3.  Laissez-Faire  Competitive  Equilibrium 
In this section we describe a competitive  equilibrium with complete  mar- 
kets. For expository  purposes,  we first discuss  the case where the market 
good  and the home  good  are perfect substitutes,  i.e.,  where  y =  0. The 
case  y >  0 will be discussed  at the end of the section.  When both goods 
are perfect substitutes,  agents  seek to maximize  the expected  discounted 
value of their wage  earnings and home production.  We assume  competi- 
tive  spot  labor  markets  in  every  island.  As  a consequence  wages  are 
given by the marginal productivity  of labor, f 
Let consider  the decision  problem  of an agent who  begins  a period  in 
an island  of type  (x,z) and must  decide  whether  to stay or leave,  taking 
the employment  level  of the island g(x,z)  and the aggregate  unemploy- 
ment level as given.  If the agent decides  to stay, he earns the competitive 
wage  ratef(g(x,z),z)  and begins  the following  period in the same island. 
If the  agent  decides  to leave,  he  becomes  nonemployed  and  obtains  a 
value  of  0 (to be  determined  below).  His problem  is then  described  by 
the following  Bellman equation: 
v(x,z)  = max {  0,f(g(x,z),z)  +  13  v(g(x,z)  +  U,z')Q(z,dz')},  (1) 
where  v(x,z) is the expected  value  of beginning  a period  in an island  of 
type  (x,z). 
At  equilibrium,  the  employment  rule g(x,z)  must  be  consistent  with 
individual  decisions.  In particular, 
1.  if v(x,z)  >  0 (agents  are strictly better off staying  than leaving),  then 
g(x,z)  =  x;  (2) 
2.  if v(x,z)  =  0 (agents  are indifferent  between  staying  or leaving),  then 
g(x,z)  = g(z),  (3) 
where g(z) satisfies 
0 = f(g(z),z)  +  ,3 f  v(g(z)  +  U,z')Q(z,dz').  (4) 272 ?  ALVAREZ  & VERACIERTO 
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Figure 1 illustrates the labor market within  an island.  Between  0 and x, 
the  labor supply  is infinitely  elastic  at 0, since  at that value  agents  are 
indifferent  between  staying  and  leaving.  For values  larger  than  0 all 
agents  prefer  to  stay,  so  the  labor  supply  becomes  inelastic  at x.  For 
values  lower  than  0 all agents  prefer  to leave,  so  the  labor supply  be- 
comes  inelastic  at zero. 
The downward-sloping  curve is the marginal value  of a worker at the 
island,  which  can be interpreted  as a demand  function  for labor. If the 
intersection  of both curves occurs at the left of x, the equilibrium employ- 
ment level  is g(z). Otherwise,  the equilibrium employment  level is x. 
Figures  2 and  3 depict  the  equilibrium  values  v(x,z)  and  equilibrium 
employment  g(x,z) that correspond  to Figure 1. If x is larger than g(z), the 
equilibrium  employment  is g(z)  and  the  equilibrium  value  is  0. If x is 
smaller than g(z),  the equilibrium  employment  is x and the equilibrium 
value  is the marginal value  of labor evaluated  at x. 
Let us now  consider  the problem  of a nonemployed  agent  who  must 
decide  whether  to go home  and obtain home  production  or search for a Labor-Market  Policies  in an Equilibrium  Search  Model  * 273 
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job.  If the agent  chooses  to stay out of the labor force, he  obtains  wh of 
home  goods  during  the  current period  but  remains  nonemployed  the 
following  period.  If the  agent  decides  to  search,  he  obtains  no  home 
production  during  the current period  but gets a new  draw at the begin- 
ning of the following  period  from the invariant distribution  /L  of islands. 
Thus the problem  of a nonemployed  agent is described  by the following 
equation: 
0 = max  { w  +  80,  f  v(x,z)  (dx X dz)  .  (5) 
If Wh +  30 <  P3fv(x,z)1l(dx  X dz) (nonemployed  agents  strictly prefer 
searching  to staying  at home) no one stays at home  and the employment 
feasibility becomes 
U +  f  g(x,z)x,(dx x  dz) =  1.  (6) 274 *  ALVAREZ  & VERACIERTO 





If Wh  +  30 =  pfv(x,z),(dx  x  dz) (nonemployed  agents  are indifferent 
between  searching  and staying  at home)  some agents may stay out of the 
labor force and employment  feasibility becomes 
U +  f  g(x,z),(dx  x  dz) -1.  (7) 
The inequality  wh +  0o  >  13fv(x,z)gt(dx  x  dz) implies  that U = 0, which 
is inconsistent  with  an equilibrium  (see Alvarez  and Veracierto, 1999). It 
follows  that 
0 =  f  v(x,z)i( dx x dz).  (8) 
In Alvarez  and Veracierto (1999) we  show  that despite  the search fric- 
tions,  this is an economy  where  the welfare  theorems  hold: laissez-faire 
competitive  allocations  coincide  with  the stationary solutions  to a Pareto Labor-Market  Policies  in an Equilibrium  Search  Model  *  275 
problem.  We also  establish  the  existence  and  uniqueness  of stationary 
competitive  equilibria.  Moreover,  our proof  provides  an efficient  algo- 
rithm to compute  the unique  steady-state  equilibrium. 
When  y >  0 market goods  and home  goods  are imperfect substitutes, 
which  is the preference  specification  used  by Hopenhayn  and Rogerson 
(1993) to  analyze  the  employment  and  welfare  effects  of  firing  taxes. 
Following them, we assume that agents have access to employment  lotter- 
ies and financial markets where they can diversify the income risk associ- 
ated with  search and employment  histories.6  The employment  lotteries 
are not  realistic.  Nevertheless,  we  think  that  the  tractability that  they 
bring  to the  problem  more  than  compensates  for their lack of realism. 
The case of y >  0 requires only minor modifications  to the equilibrium 
conditions  presented  above.  If 0 is interpreted  as the  present  value  of 
search in terms  of market  goods,  equation  (8) is satisfied  by  definition 
and the functional  equation  (1) still describes optimal behavior by agents 
and firms within  the islands  sector. The only equilibrium  condition  that 
must by modified  is the one  that determines  the optimal  mix of agents 
between  market and home  activities.  The new  relevant condition  is 
wh 
<  c-YO. 
1-f3 
The left-hand  side  of  this  equation  gives  the  present-value  gain  of in- 
creasing by one unit the number of agents in the home  sector. The right- 
hand side represents  the present-value  loss of decreasing  by one unit the 
number  of agents  that search: it is the present  value  of forgone wages  in 
terms of consumption  goods,  0, times the marginal utility of consuption, 
c-.  At equilibrium, both sides must be equal if there is a positive  number 
of agents at home.  If the right-hand side is larger than the left-hand  side, 
no one must be at home  in equilibrium. 
In Alvarez  and Veracierto (1999) we  show  that the equilibrium unem- 
ployment  rate is independent  of the value of y. Instead  y determines  the 
elasticity  of the labor supply,  with  y =  0 corresponding  to an infinitely 
elastic labor supply  and a large y corresponding  to a low elasticity. 
In the  description  that  follows  of the  equilibrium  conditions  for the 
different policies  we focus on the case where  y = 0 to simplify the exposi- 
tion.  The case where  y >  0 would  require modifications  to the  optimal 
nonemployment  decisions  analogous  to the ones just described. 
6. Prescott and Rios-Rull (1992) show  how  to use classical competitive  equilibrium analysis 
to study  a similar economy  by using  lotteries. 276 *  ALVAREZ  & VERACIERTO 
4.  Labor-Market  Policies 
In this section we introduce  a variety of labor-market policies and institu- 
tions  into  our  model  economy.  In  particular,  we  consider  minimum 
wages,  unions,  firing taxes,  and unemployment  insurance. 
4.1 MINIMUM  WAGES 
The first labor-market policy  we  consider  is minimum-wage  legislation. 
If equilibrium wages  in an island are lower than the mandated  minimum 
wage  t,  employment  must be rationed.  In this case, a lottery determines 
who  becomes  employed.  The losers  of the lottery are forced to leave the 
island and become nonemployed.7  Throughout  the section we denote by 
x(z) the maximum  employment  level  consistent  with  o and z, i.e., 
o=  f(x(z),z). 
Let's  consider  the  problem  of  an  agent  that  begins  a period  in  an 
island  of type  (x,z). If g(x,z)  <  x(z), the minimum  wage  does not bind in 
the island  and the problem  of the agent is similar to laissez-faire: 
v(x,z)  = max { O,f(g(x,z),z) + 1 f  v(g(x,z) + U,z')Q(z,dz')  . 
But if g(x,z)  = x(z), the minimum  wage binds and an employment  lottery 
takes place. Since the lottery treats all agents the same way, the probabil- 
ity  that the  agent  wins  is  given  by  x(z)/x.  In that  case  he  receives  the 
minimum  wage  o during  the  current period  and  begins  the  following 
period  in the same island.  His expected  value is then  given by8 
x(z)  (i 
'  \  -  x(z)  v(x,z)  =  -  ( f((z),z)  + 13  v(x(z) +  U,z')Q(z,dz')  +  0. 
x  \  I  I  x 
Figure 4 illustrates the labor market when  the minimum  wage  binds.  At 
the equilibrium  employment  level,  wages  are lower  than the minimum 
wage.  Hence,  the  labor supply  must be rationed  down  to x(z) workers. 
The decision  problem  of nonemployed  agents as well as the rest of the 
equilibrium  conditions  are the same as under laissez-faire. 
7. In actual  computations  we allow the losers of the lotteries  to stay in the islands if they so 
desire. But (except for extreme cases) we found that they always preferred  to leave 
rather than to stay without working. As a consequence, here we describe the more 
restrictive  but simpler case where agents are forced to leave. In Alvarez and Veracierto 
(1999) we  discuss  the more general case. 
8. In Alvarez  and Veracierto (1999) we  show  thatf(?(z),z)  +  ,3 f  v(x(z) +  U,z')Q(z,dz')  >  0: 
agents  always  prefer going  through  the employment  lottery to leaving  directly. Labor-Market  Policies  in an Equilibrium  Search  Model  *  277 
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4.1.1.  Insider-Outsider Model of Minimum Wages  We explore a variation 
on the previous  case in order to capture the distinction  between  insiders 
and outsiders.  In this case we  assume  that when  the minimum  wage  is 
binding,  the rationing  scheme  gives priority to the previously  employed 
agents.  More specifically, the agents that worked  in the island last period 
(the insiders, of whom  there are x -  U) are given  priority over the ones 
that searched  last period  and just  arrived (the outsiders, of whom  there 
are U). We assume  that if rationing must take place,  one of the following 
two  cases  applies:  either (1) all insiders  stay employed  and the remain- 
ing x(z) -  x -  U positions  are rationed among the U outsiders,  or (2) the 
available x(z) positions  are rationed among the x -  U insiders,  and none 
of the U outsiders  are employed. 
The analysis  of minimum  wages  for this case is similar to the previous 
one,  but  it requires  some  additional  notation  to consider  the  different 
problems  of  outsiders  and  insiders.  The  details  of the  analysis  can be 
found  in Alvarez  and Veracierto (1999). 278 *  ALVAREZ  & VERACIERTO 
4.2 UNIONS 
We assume  that a fraction A of the islands  are unionized.  In these  islands 
a union  determines  the total labor supply, taking the wages  of the rest of 
the  economy  as  given.  Once  the  union  decides  how  many  agents  are 
permitted  to work in the island,  there is a competitive  market in which 
workers  are paid  their marginal  productivity.  Agents  that are restricted 
from entering  this competitive  labor market leave the island and become 
nonemployed.  We explore  two extreme assumptions  on the distribution 
of the rents generated  by the union.  In the first case, which  we label the 
coalition model, we  assume  that rents  are shared  equally  among  all cur- 
rent union  members.  In the second  case,  which  we  label the union-boss 
model, we  assume  that they are entirely  captured by one individual. 
We use  a simple  story to illustrate the two  models.  Consider  an econ- 
omy  made  out a large number  of piers,  where  cargo must be unloaded 
from  ships,  and  where  the  number  of  ships  arriving  at  each  pier  is 
random.  Workers are distributed  across  piers  and  take  one  period  to 
move  between  them.  There is a gate  in each pier,  on  the  other side  of 
which  ship  managers  hire  workers  in  a competitive  spot  market.  The 
two model  of unions  differ on the assumption  about the control over the 
gate.  In the  coalition  model  the  gate  is  controlled  by  all the  workers 
present  in  the  pier  at the  beginning  of  the  period.  In the  union-boss 
model  the gate is controlled  by a union boss. 
4.2.1  The  Coalition  Model  We denote  the total expected  discounted  earn- 
ings of the coalition  in an island  of type  (x,z) by u(x,z). Since we  assume 
that  the  monopoly  rents  of  the  coalition  are shared  equally  among  all 
workers  in  the  island,  each  agent  receives  a value  u(x,z)/x.  The  union 
maximizes  the expected  discounted  value of earnings of its current mem- 
bers.  Hence,  u satisfies 
u(x,z)  = max  f(g,z)g  +  O[x  -  g] +  3  u(g  +  U,z')Q(z,dz')  ,  (9)  0o<g-x  g +  UJ 
where  g  is  the  number  of  agents  that  the  union  allows  to  work-i.e. 
those  allowed  to cross  the  gate.  The present  discounted  value  of total 
earnings  of the agents that leave the island equals  0[x -  g]. On the other 
hand,  the  total  current  wage  earnings  of  the  agents  that become  em- 
ployed  equalf(g,z)g.  Each of these agents  receive a value u(g +  U,z')/(g  + 
U) starting the following  period,  since they will form a coalition with the 
U  new  agents  that  will  arrive  to  the  island.  The  total  expected  dis- 
counted  value  of the g members  that are allowed  to stay is given  by last 
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The Bellman  equation  in  (9) has  a nonstandard  structure  due  to the 
endogenous  discount  factor  pg/<g  +  U).  However,  in  Alvarez  and 
Veracierto (1999) we  show  that a unique  value  function  u satisfies  this 
Bellman equation,  that it is concave  and differentiable,  and that its opti- 
mal employment  policy is described by a threshold  rule of the same form 
as in the competitive  islands. 
Competitive  islands  behave  exactly  the  same  as  under  laissez-faire. 
The employment  decision  rule of unionized  islands  generates  an invari- 
ant distribution  J/U,  while  the  employment  decision  rule of competitive 
islands  generates  an invariant  distribution  L. The decision  problem  of 
nonemployed  agents  is then given by 
0 = max{  wh +  30, 
/3A  f  u(x,z)  -U(dx X'dz)  +  /(1  -  A) f  v(x,z)i(dx  X dz). 
Note  that  agents  that  search  have  no  control  over  whether  they  will 
arrive at a unionized  island or not.  As in the previous  cases,  if the right- 
hand  side  of  this  expression  is  larger than  the  left-hand  side,  no  one 
stays out of the labor force. 
4.2.2  The Union-Boss  Model  In a unionized  island a union boss  acts as a 
monopolist  with  respect  to the competitive  firms and as a monopsonist 
with  respect  to  the  workers.  The  union  boss  maximizes  his  own  ex- 
pected  discounted  revenue  net of payments  to workers,  so he solves 
V(x,z) = max {f(g,z)g  -  gO(l -  ) +  3  V(g +  U,z')Q(z,dz')  },  (10) 
where  g  is  the  number  of  workers  that  he  allows  to  work.  Letting  0 
denote  the equilibrium  nonemployment  value  for a worker,  note  that a 
worker is indifferent  between  working  at the wage  0(1 -  /3) and leaving 
the island.  The union  boss  can then  charge an access  fee to workers,  so 
that  after paying  this  fee  they  receive  only  0(1  -  /3). In Alvarez  and 
Veracierto (1999) we  show  that  the  optimal  employment  policy  is  de- 
scribed by  a threshold  rule similar to that which  characterizes  employ- 
ment in competitive  islands. 
Letting  A"  and AL  be the invariant distribution  corresponding  to union- 
ized and competitive  islands,  optimality  of search decisions  requires that 
0 = max {wh +  /0,  (1 -  A)/3  f  v(x,z)A(dx X dz) +  A/30}, 280 *  ALVAREZ  & VERACIERTO 
where  we  use  the  fact  that  the  value  for  a worker  of  arriving  at  an 
unionized  island is 0. 
4.3 FIRING  TAXES 
In  this  subsection  we  consider  a  competitive  equilibrium  with  firing 
taxes: whenever  a firm reduces  employment  below  its previous-period 
level,  the firm must  pay  a tax r per unit reduction  in employment.  The 
proceeds  are rebated as lump-sum  transfers. 
Because  of  the  firing  cost  T, the  firms'  maximization  problem  now 
becomes  dynamic.  The  individual  state  of  a  firm  is  given  by  (x,n,z), 
where  n is its previous-period  employment  level.  The firms's problem  is 
described  by the following  Bellman equation: 
R(x,n,z)  =  max  {F(g,z)  -  w(x,z)g -  rmax  {n -  g,0} 
+3  f  R(G(x,z) +  U,g,z')Q(z,dz')}  (11) 
where  g is current employment,  F(g,z) is output,  and r max{n -  g,0} are 
the firing taxes.  The firm behaves  competitively,  taking the equilibrium 
employment  level  G(x,z) of the island,  the equilibrium wage  rate w(x,z), 
and the number  U of agents  that search as given.  We denote  the optimal 
employment  decision  rule for this problem by g(x,n,z). 
Note  that at equilibrium,  the islands'  employment  rule must be gener- 
ated by the individual  decisions  of firms. In particular, 
g(x,x  -  U,z) =  G(x,z)  for all x,z, 
where  x -  U is the previous-period  employment  level  of the island. 
The  problem  of  a worker  in  an  island  of  type  (x,z)  is  given  by  the 
following  Bellman equation: 
H(x,z) = max  w(x,z) +  f  H(G(x,z)  + U,z')Q(z,dz'), 0  (12) 
where  0 is the value of nonemployment.  The worker chooses  to leave the 
island whenever  the expected  discounted  value of wages  in the island is 
less  than  the value  of nonemployment.  Similarly to firms,  workers  be- 
have competitively,  taking the island's employment  level G(x,z), the equi- 
librium  wage  rate w(x,z),  and  the  number  U of  agents  that  search  as 
given. 
Figure  5  illustrates  the  behavior  of  an  island's  labor  market  under 
firing taxes.  The supply  curve is similar to that under  laissez-faire:  it is 
infinitely  elastic at 0, and becomes  inelastic  at x for values  larger than  0. 
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Figure  5 EMPLOYMENT  DETERMINATION,  FIRING  TAXES  (FIRMS  PAY  TAX) 
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ticular, the firing tax introduces  a wedge  between  the marginal value  of 
hiring  and  the marginal  value  of firing a worker.  This translates  into a 
jump  of  size  T at  the  previous-period  employment  level  n,  which  in 
equilibrium  equals  x  -  U. Note  that only  large  enough  shocks  induce 
firms to hire  or fire workers.  For intermediate  shocks,  firms will  leave 
their labor force unchanged. 
The decision problem of nonemployed  agents and the rest of the equilib- 
rium conditions  are the  same  as under  laissez-faire,  so  we  omit  them. 
Note  that equilibrium wages  w(x,z) are not equal to marginal productivi- 
tiesf(g(x,z),z).  Instead, wages  have to be lower than marginal productivi- 
ties,  effectively  making workers prepay  the firing taxes. 
In Alvarez  and Veracierto (1999) we  show  that a competitive  equilib- 
rium  with  firing  taxes  coincides  with  the  stationary  solution  to  a con- 
strained  Pareto  problem,  where  the  planner  treats  the  employment 
separation  costs  as technological.  This is an important  result.  It estab- 
lishes  that  the  spot  labor  contracts  considered  above  are sufficient  to 
exploit  all  mutually  beneficial  trades,  even  in  the  presence  of  search 282 *  ALVAREZ  & VERACIERTO 
frictions  and  firing taxes.  We also  show  that the  equilibrium  described 
above  coincides  (except for equilibrium  wages)  with  a competitive  equi- 
librium  where  the  firing  taxes  are paid  directly  by  the  workers.  The 
advantage  of this  alternative  decentralization  is that it is much  simpler 
to  analyze,  since  it  requires  only  a small  variation  on  the  arguments 
used  in the laissez-faire  case. 
4.4 UNEMPLOYMENT  INSURANCE 
In this subsection  we  introduce  an unemployment  insurance  system  in 
which  the government  plays unemployment  benefits  b to eligible agents, 
financing the system with lump-sum  taxes. Nonemployed  agents may or 
may  not  be  eligible  for benefits.  Whenever  an  agent  leaves  an  island 
where  he was employed  during the previous  period,  he becomes  eligible 
for benefits  with  probability  K. Eligible agents lose their eligibility for the 
following  period  with  probability  qf.  Agents  that lose  their benefits  can- 
not regain eligibility  within  the same spell of unemployment.9 
Given  the  nature  of  the  unemployment  insurance  system,  we  must 
keep track not only of whether  nonemployed  agents  are out of the labor 
force or unemployed,  but of whether  they are eligible for benefits  or not. 
Let 00  be the expected  value of being nonemployed  without  benefits,  01 
the  value  of being  nonemployed  with  benefits,  UO  the  number  of new 
arrivals (i.e.,  agents  that searched  during  the previous  period)  who  are 
not eligible for benefits  during the current period,  and U1  the number of 
new  arrivals who  are eligible for benefits  during the current period.  Note 
that U =  UO  +  U1. Agents  learn whether  they are eligible  for benefits  or 
not at the beginning  of the period. 
The  problem  of  an  agent  who  was  employed  during  the  previous 
period  in an island  with  current state (x,z) is described by the following 
Bellman equation: 
v(x,z) = max { K01  +  (1-  K)0o/ 
f(g(x,z),z)+  p  v(g(x,z) + U,z')Q(z,dz) 
where  g(x,z) and U are taken as given by the agent. 
The problem  of an agent  who  searched  the  previous  period,  has  UI 
eligiblity  i,  and  arrives at an island  with  current state  (x,z) is given  by 
ui(x,z) = max  O0,  f(g(x,z),z)  +  f  v(g(x,z)  +  U,z')Q(z,dz') 
where  i =  1 if the agent is eligible for benefits,  and i =0 otherwise. 
9. We model  the eligibility  and duration of the benefits  as stochastic  to reduce  the dimen- 
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We now  consider  the nonemployment  decisions  of eligible and ineligi- 
ble  agents.  If an  agent  not  eligible  for  UI benefits  decides  to  stay  at 
home,  he  obtains  home  production  wh during  the  current period.  The 
following  period  he  will  be  nonemployed  and  ineligible  for benefits, 
obtaining  a value  00. If he  decides  to search,  he  will  draw an island  of 
type  (x,z) under the invariant distribution,  obtaining  a value uo(x,z). His 
problem  is then  described by 
00 =  max {  w  +  10,  13 f Uo(xX  z)i,(dx  X dz) 
If an  agent  eligible  for UI benefits  decides  to  go  home,  he  obtains 
home  production  wh  during  the current period.  The following  period he 
will become  ineligible  for benefits  with  probability 1 -  q4  and will still be 
eligible for benefits  with probability 4q,  obtianing values  01  and 00  respec- 
tively.  If the  agent  decides  to search,  he  will  draw  an island  type  (x,z) 
under the invariant distribution,  obtaining  a value Uo(x,z)  with probabil- 
ity 1 -  4i  and a value  u,(x,z) with probability  4, depending  whether  the 
agent  loses  his eligibility  for UI benefits  or not.  His decision  problem  is 
then described by the following  equation: 
01 =  b + max {  vh  +  j3[01  +  (1  -  q)00], 
13  f  [4ux(x,z) +  (1 - 
q)uo(x,z)]l(dx  X dz) 
Note  that the  agent  receives  UI benefits  independently  of whether  he 
stays out of the labor force or searches. 
We  denote  by  4i E  [0,1]  the  fraction  of  nonemployed  agents  with 
eligiblity i = 0, 1 that decide  to search. The equilibrium values  of Xi  must 
be  consistent  with  the  optimal  nonemployment  decision  described 
above.  In particular, 
zw +  9  p0o  >  f uo(x,z))(dx x dz)  =  0 = 0, 
wh  +  10o  < 3 f Uo(x,z)t(dx x  dz)  =>  o =  1, 
and correspondingly  for  b1. 
To describe  aggregate  consistency,  it is useful  to introduce  the follow- 
ing notation.  Let Hi be the number  of nonemployed  agents  that stayed 
home  during the previous  period and have eligibility i during the current 
period,  and  let  Di be  the  total  number  of  agents  with  eligibility  i that 
leave  the  islands  during  the  current period.  Note  that D1 includes  two 
types  of  agents:  (1) agents  who  searched  during  the  previous  period, 
whose  benefits  have  not  expired  during  the  current period,  and  who 284 - ALVAREZ  & VERACIERTO 
reject employment,  and  (2) all previously  employed  agents  who  decide 
to leave  their islands  and gain eligibility. In particular,10 
D1 = f min {U,x  -  g(x,z)}  ,(dx X dz) 
+  K f max { min { x -  U1 -  U0,x -  U1 -  g(x,z)}, 0}. 
On  the  other  hand,  Do consists  of  (1) all new  arrivals without  benefits 
who  decide  not to accept employment,  and (2) all previously  employed 
agents who  leave  and do not gain eligibility: 
Do = f max{U0 -  g(x,z),  O}  ,u(dx x  dz) 
+  (1  -  K) f max{min{x -U1  -  Uo, x -  U1  -  g(x,z)}, 0}. 
In steady  state,  U0, U1, H0, and H1 satisfy their laws  of motion: 
Uo =  o(D + Ho) +  (1 -  iq)l(Dl  + H1), 
U1 =  q1(D,  +  Hi), 
Ho =  (1 -  4o)(Do + Ho) +  (1 -  4q)  (1 -  4l)(Dl  + H1), 
H1 =  qi(1 -  l1)(Dl  +  H1). 
The market-clearing  condition  is given by 
U0 + Ho +  U1 + H1 +  f  g(x,z)(dx  x  dz) =  1. 
4.4.1  UI Benefits,  Firing Subsidies,  Firing Taxes,  and Severance  Payments  We 
conclude  this section with a brief analysis  of the relationship  between  UI 
benefits,  firing taxes, firing subsidies,  and severance  payments.  Define p 
as the expected  discounted  payments  that an agent is entitled to after a job 
separation,  contingent  on not becoming  employed  until the expiration of 
benefits,  so that 
b 
p =  K  .  (13) 
1 -  443 
In Alvarez and Veracierto (1999) we show  that nonemployed  agents with 
benefits  search (1l  >  0) only  if all nonemployed  agents  without  benefits 
search (40 = 1). Moreover, we establish that for small values  of p, equilib- 
10. Since 01  >  00,  the first agents to leave an island are those who have just arrived  and 
are eligible for benefits, the second group to leave are those who were employed the 
previous period, and the last agents to leave are those who have just arrived  and are 
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ria with  UI benefits  have  41 =  0 and 0 <  0o  <  1. In words,  agents  that 
receive UI benefits  do not seach,  and agents  that have no UI benefits  are 
indifferent  between  searching  and  staying  out of the labor force.  It fol- 
lows  that the only  feature that is important  in the UI benefits  system  is 
the expected  discounted  value of payments  (p), regardless of the particu- 
lar combination  of duration (ti), benefits  per period  (b), and eligiblity  (K). 
Since agents  eligible for benefits  do not search, this results shows  that in 
our model  UI benefits  are equivalent  to a firing subsidy  in the amount p. 
The previous  result has the following  two important corrolaries about 
the combined  effects of firing taxes and UI benefits,  whose  proofs can be 
found  in Alvarez  and Veracierto (1999). First, these  policies  can be sum- 
marized by a single  number: the expected  discounted  value  of UI bene- 
fits minus of the value of firing taxes. In particular, if p'  p -  T > 0, then 
the equilibrium is the same as with a firing subsidy  of p'. Alternatively,  if 
p' < 0 the equilibrium is the same as with a firing tax of size p'. Second,  if 
we  interpret  severance  payments  as a tax on  the  firms proportional  to 
the employment  reductions  and a simultaneous  subsidy  to each worker 
that leaves  the firm, then  one  obtains  that severance  payments  have no 
effect.  This is a known  result  for competitive  markets; see  for example 
Lazear (1990). What is interesting  is that it holds  even  in the presence  of 
the search frictions. 
5.  Calibration 
To explore  the  effects  of the  labor-market policies  described  above,  we 
parametrize  the economy  in the following  way.  There are six structural 
parameters  to  determine:  (1) the  Cobb-Douglas  parameter  a,  (2) the 
time  discount  factor  3, (3) the  home  productivity  wh, (4) the  curvature 
parameter  in the  utility  function,  y, (4) the  persistence  of productivity 
shocks,  p, and  (5) the variance  of the  innovations,  o2. Additionally  we 
have  to choose  the model  period.  Parameter values  are chosen  to repro- 
duce selected  U.S. observations  under a policy regime that resembles  the 
U.S.  unemployment  insurance  system.  We select a model  period  of one 
and  a half  months  as a compromise  between  computational  costs  and 
our interest in matching  the short average duration of unemployment  in 
the United  States. 
A characteristic of the U.S.  system  is that it is financed by experience- 
rated taxes. Experience-rated taxes work as firing taxes: they increase the 
tax liabilities of employers  when  workers are fired. Anderson  and Meyer 
(1993) report that they are quite substantial in magnitude:  for each dollar 
that the  government  pays  as unemployment  insurance,  about  60 cents 
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to  consider  a  policy  regime  with  both  unemployment  insurance  and 
experience-rated  taxes.  We use  the  property  of the  model  described  in 
Section 4.4.1 to introduce both policies  in a parsimonious  way. We inter- 
pret the experience-rated  UI tax as a firing tax and set the UI benefits  in 
the model  equal to the present  value  of the UI benefits  net of this firing 
tax. In particular, we consider the "net" UI benefits  to be 40% of the U.S. 
unemployment  insurance  benefits. 
In a sample  of agents  that collected  insurance  benefits  between  1978 
and  1983,  Meyer  (1990) found  an  average  replacement  ratio  of  about 
66%. Given  Anderson  and  Meyer's  estimate  of  experience-rated  taxes 
and our previous  discussion,  we  select a replacement  ratio which  is 60% 
of Meyer's,  or 26%. Meyer (1990) also reported that the average duration 
of agents  in his sample  is 13 weeks.  Since we  are proceeding  under  the 
assumption  that agents  that collect benefits  do  not  search,  we  identify 
the  13 weeks  with  the  average  duration  of UI benefits.  Given  a model 
period  of 6 weeks,  this  translates  to a persistence  of UI benefits,  iq, of 
about 0.50. 
The probability  K  that an agent becomes  eligible for UI benefits  at the 
start of an unemployment  spell is chosen  as follows.  Let h be the escape 
rate from unemployment,  and  I the  flow  out  of employment.  Then  in 
steady  state 
hU = I.  (14) 
Let H1 be the number  of agents  that stay out of the labor force collecting 
UI benefits.  Note  that 
(1 -  q)Hl =  KI,  (15) 
since the flow  out of H1 is given  by the number  of agents  that lose  their 
benefits,  and the  flow  into  H1 is equal to a fraction K of the flow  out of 
employment.  At steady  state the two  flows  must be equal.  Substituting 
(14) in (15), we  obtain 
1 -  H1 
K  = 
h  U 
Note  that  H1/U  is  the  ratio  of  the  number  of  agents  that  receive  UI 
benefits  to the  total number  of agents  that are unemployed.  In OECD 
(1994, Table 8.4),  we  find that this ratio is about 0.35 for the U.S.  econ- 
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in the U.S. suggests  a value of 1/h equal to 2.66 model  periods.  The value 
of K consistent  with  these  magnitudes  is 0.50. 
The Cobb-Douglas  parameter a was set to match a labor share of 0.64, 
which  is the value  implicit in the NIPA accounts.  The discount  factor  3 
was  selected  so that its reciprocal reproduces  an annual  interest  rate of 
4%,  a  compromise  between  the  return  on  equity  and  the  return  on 
bonds. 
Given  all  the  previous  choices,  the  persistence  of  the  productivity 
shocks  (p) and the variance of its innovations  (o2) were selected  to gener- 
ate  an  average  duration  of  unemployment  equal  to  4 months  and  an 
unemployment  rate  of  6.2%.  Note  that  there  is  no  analytical  relation 
between  these  parameters  and  the  corresponding  observations;  we  ex- 
perimented  until a good  fit was  obtained. 
In Alvarez and Veracierto (1999) we show that the productivity  of home 
production,  wh, affects only the labor-force participation ratio, leaving  all 
other ratios unchanged.  The productivity  wh  was  then selected  to repro- 
duce a labor force participation of 0.79, which is the ratio of labor force to 
working-age  population  in the  United  States  (OECD,  1994, Table 8.4). 
The curvature  parameter  y in the  utility function  determines  the  de- 
gree of substitutability  between  home  goods  and market goods,  but has 
no effect on steady-state  observations  (it only affects the value  of wh  that 
is needed  to reproduce  a given  labor-force participation).  However,  y is 
an important  determinant  of the elasticity  of labor supply.  In particular, 
it can be  shown  that  the  elasticity  of labor-force participation  with  re- 
spect to labor taxes is equal to 
1  T 
E  = 
- 
~,-  (16) 
1  -  a  -  ay  1-  T 
where  T is the labor tax. 
One way of selecting  y is then to use equation  (16) to calibrate to some 
empirical  estimate  of  the  elasticity  E. The  regression  coefficients  in 
Nickell  (1997, Table 7) indicate  that a cross-country  elasticity  E equal to 
0.18 is not unreasonable.  Since the average labor tax in Nickell's  sample 
is about 50%, our choice of a requires a value of y equal to 8 to reproduce 
such an elasticity. 
Another  way  of selecting  y is to use macro observations.  One stylized 
fact that has  been  emphasized  in the  macroeconomic  literature is that 
wages  have increased substantially  over long period of times, while  total 
hour worked  have displayed  no trend. To reconcile this observation  with 
the  theory,  preferences  where  income  and  substitution  effects  cancel 288 *  ALVAREZ  & VERACIERTO 
Table  1 
Parameters 
a  Cobb-Douglas parameter  0.64 
1p  Time preference  0.9951 
y  Substitution  between market  and home goods  1 
p  Persistence  of z  0.98724 
o2  Innovation  variance  of z  0.00838 
wh  Productivity  at home  0.817 
U.S. Observations 
Labor  share  0.64 
Interest  rate  4%  (annual) 
Employment/population  0.79 
Average duration  of unemployment  4 months 
Unemployment rate  6.2% 
U.S. Policies 
Average duration  of UI benefits collected  3 months 
UI recipients/unemployed  35% 
Replacement  ratio  66% 
Experience  rating  60% 
each other are needed.  This requires a choice  of y =1  under our prefer- 
ence  specification.  This  parameter  value  is  not  only  consistent  with 
macro  secular  observations  (and  consequently  common  in  the  macro- 
economic  literature), but is what  Hopenhayn  and Rogerson  (1993) have 
used  to estimate  the welfare  costs  of firing taxes.  As a consequence  we 
will treat it as our benchmark,  but we will also report results under y = 0 
and  y =  8. 
Table 1 reports selected  parameter values  under the benchmark case.11 
6. Experiments 
This section  analyzes  the effects of the labor-market policies  and institu- 
tions  introduced  above  for the parameters  selected  in the previous  sec- 
tion.  In each subsection  we  report how  the corresponding  policy  affects 
laissez-faire,  which  serves  as our benchmark case. 
Tables  2  through  5  show  the  results.  To illustrate  the  role  of  the 
elasticity  of labor supply,  the tables report results for different values  of 
y. The efects  on the unemployment  rate, the average duration  of unem- 
ployment,  and  the  rate  of  of  incidence  into  unemployment  are pre- 
sented  at the top of each table since they are independent  of y. The rest 
of  each  table  shows  results  under  y  =  0  (the  case  where  home  and 
11. Parameter  values under y = 0 and y = 8 are available  upon request. Labor-Market  Policies  in an Equilibrium  Search  Model  ?  289 
market goods  are perfect substitutes),  y =  1 (our benchmark  log utility 
case),  y = 8 (the case of low elasticity of labor supply).  For each of these 
we report the following:  (1) total unemployment  (i.e. the total number  U 
of agents  that search in the model  economy),  (2) total employment,  (3) 
total market output,  and (4) total home  output.  Each of these numbers  is 
normalized  by its corresponding  laissez-faire  value.  Additionally  a wel- 
fare  measure  is  provided.  It is  defined  as  the  permanent  increase  in 
consumption  that must be given to agents in the laissez-faire  economy  to 
attain the same utility level as under the policy considered. 
6.1 MINIMUM  WAGES 
Table 2a describe the effects of minimum  wages.  The third column corre- 
sponds  to laissez-faire,  while  the fourth and fifth columns  correspond  to 
minimum  wages  equivalent  to 85% and 90% of average  wages,  respec- 
tively. In the first case only 5% of employed  agents receive the minimum 
wage; in the second  case the fraction is 27%. 
We see  in Table 2a that introducing  a minimum  wage  into  an other- 
wise  laissez-faire  economy  increases  the incidence  of agents  into unem- 
ployment.  The  reason  is  that  employment  must  now  be  rationed  in 
islands where the minimum  wage becomes  binding.  For the same reason 
it becomes  more difficult for unemployed  agents to find employment.  As 
a consequence  the  average  duration  of unemployment  increases.  Both 
effects  tend  to increase  the unemployment  rate relative  to laissez-faire. 
However,  we  find that the effects  are small: a minimum  wage  equal to 
85% of average wages  increases  the unemployment  rate only from 5.3% 
to 5.4%. Higher  minimum  wages  can increase  the  unemployment  rate 
further. But even  a minimum  wage  which  is large enough  so that 27% of 
employed  agents  receive  it increases  the unemployment  rate from 5.3% 
to only 6.6%, a small effect compared  to other policies. 
The  minimum-wage  regulation  has  the  effect  of  increasing  average 
wages.  As  a result,  the  number  of agents  that  search  for a job (U) in- 
creases until indifference  between  working  at home  and at the market is 
restored  [i.e.  until equality  in equation  (8) is obtained].  Table 2a shows 
that  when  home  and  market  goods  are perfect  substitutes  (y  =  0),  a 
minimum  wage  equal to 90% of average wages  increases  the number of 
agents  unemployed  (U) by 24.7%. However,  employment  falls by 1.9% 
because  the  increase  in the  unemployment  rate is large  relative  to the 
increase  in the number  of agents  unemployed.  The fall in employment 
dominates  the increase  in unemployment,  and labor-force participation 
decreases.  This leads  to an increase  in home  output  of 1.8% and a de- 
crease in market output  of 0.5%. 
At the other extreme,  when  y =  8, the effects  are quite different.  The 290 *  ALVAREZ  & VERACIERTO 
Table 2  MINIMUM WAGES AS PERCENTAGE OF AVERAGE WAGES 
Value 
Minimum  Wage 
y  Quantity  Laissez-Faire  85%  90% 
(a) No Priority 
Unemployment  rate 
Avg.  duration  of unemployment 
Incidence  of unemployment 
0.0  Employment 
Unemployment 
Market output 
Home  output 
Change  in welfarea 
1.0  Employment 
Unemployment 
Market output 
Home  output 
Change  in welfarea 
8.0  Employment 
Unemployment 
Market output 
Home  output 
Change  in welfare, 
(b) Priority 
Unemployment  rate 
Avg.  duration of unemp. 
Incidence  of unemp. 
0.0  Employment 
Unemployment 
Market output 
Home  output 
Change  in welfarea 
1.0  Employment 
Unemployment 
Market output 
Home  output 
Change  in welfare, 
8.0  Employment 
Unemployment 
Market output 
Home  output 





































5.4  6.6 
2.4  2.8 
2.3  2.6 
99.9  98.1 
102.1  124.7 
100.0  99.5 
100.1  101.8 
0.0  -0.2 
99.9  98.6 
102.1  125.4 
100.0  99.8 
100.0  100.0 
0.0  -0.2 
99.9  98.9 
102.3  126.0 
100.0  100.0 
100.0  99.0 
0.0  -0.1 
5.4  6.6 
2.4  2.8 
2.3  2.5 
100.0  97.8 
102.3  124.8 
100.1  99.3 
99.8  102.5 
0.0  -0.2 
99.9  98.5 
102.2  125.7 
100.0  99.7 
99.9  100.1 
0.0  -0.2 
100.0  98.9 
101.4  125.6 
100.1  100.0 
99.7  98.9 
0.0  -0.2 
aPercentage of consumption,  with respect to laissez-faire. Labor-Market  Policies  in an Equilibrium  Search  Model  *  291 
fall in market output  increases  the  marginal  utility  of market goods  so 
much  that  agents  respond  by  substituting  away  from home  activities 
towards  market activities.  As  a consequence,  the  labor-force participa- 
tion  increases  and  home  production  decreases.  Employment  still  de- 
creases,  because  the  increase  in labor-force participation  is small  com- 
pared  to  the  increase  in  the  unemployment  rate.  However,  the  fall in 
market output  now  becomes  negligible. 
The welfare effects of minimum  wages  are extremely  small. Even for a 
minimum  wage  equal to 90% of average wages,  the welfare  cost is only 
about 0.2% in terms of consumption. 
In Table 2b we  compute  the effects of minimum  wages  when  the em- 
ployment  rationing scheme  gives priority to insiders over outsiders.  This 
feature could  potentially  increase the duration  of unemployment,  since 
outsiders-agents  that search-are  rationed more often. However,  the re- 
sults are virtually the same: we still find small effects of minimum  wages. 
6.2 UNIONS 
Table 3a reports  the  effects  of  the  coalition  model  of unions.  Table 3b 
reports  the  effects  of the  union-boss  model.  In both  cases  we  compare 
laissez  faire with  economies  that have  20%, 40%, 60%, and 80% of their 
islands  unionized. 
We describe  the  coalition  model  of unions  first.  Recall that  a union 
obtains  monopolistic  rents from the fixed factor by restricting the labor 
supply  of its members.  As a consequence,  unionized  islands have higher 
unemployment  rates than competitive  islands  (for instance,  with 20% of 
the labor force unionized,  the unemployment  rate is 4 percentage  points 
smaller  in the  competitive  sector than  in the  unionized  sector).  As  the 
number  of  unionized  islands  increases,  the  aggregate  unemployment 
rate of the economy  increases  due to a composition  effect.  Moreover,  as 
the size  of the unionized  sector becomes  larger, the average duration of 
unemployment  and  the  incidence  into  unemployment  in both  sectors 
tend  to increase.  The reason  is that agents  demand  better conditions  to 
become  and remain employed,  since it is easier for them to find monopo- 
listic rents somewhere  else.  As a consequence,  a larger unionized  sector 
unambiguously  increases  the aggregate  unemployment  rate in the econ- 
omy.  In fact Table 3a shows  that the  effects  of unions  are surprisingly 
large.  When  60% of the islands  become  unionized,  the unemployment 
rate increases  from 5.3% to 12.5%. 
Since  unions  extract rents  from  the  fixed  factor,  average  wages  in- 
crease  with  the  size  of the  union  sector  (since  the  opportunity  cost  of 
becoming  employed  in the competitive  sector increases,  wages  increase 
in  the  competitive  sector  as well).  When  home  and  market  goods  are 292 *  ALVAREZ  & VERACIERTO 
Table  3 
(a) Unions as Coalitions 
Value 
Islands  Unionized 
y  Quantity  Laissez-Faire 20%  40%  60%  80% 
Unemployment rate 
Avg. duration  of unemp. 
Incidence  of unemp. 
Wage Premiuma  (%) 
0.0  Employment 
Unemployment 
Market  output 
Home output 
Change in welfareb 
1.0  Employment 
Unemployment 
Market  output 
Home output 
Change in welfareb 
8.0  Employment 
Unemployment 
Market  output 
Home output 
Change in welfareb 
Competitive  islands: 
Unemployment rate 
Avg. duration  of 
unemp. 
Incidence  of unemp. 
Unionized islands: 
Unemployment rate 
Avg. duration  of 
unemp. 




































































































2.6  2.8  3.0  3.2 
10.6  13.0  15.6  18.3 
3.8  4.4  5.1  5.8 
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(b) Union-Boss  Model 
Value 
Islands  Unionized 
y  Quantity  Laissez-Faire 20%  40%  60%  80% 
Unemployment rate 
Avg. duration  of unem- 
ployment 
Incidence  of unemploy- 
ment 
0.0  Employment 
Unemployment 
Market  output 
Home output 
Change in welfareb 
1.0  Employment 
Unemployment 
Market  output 
Home output 
Change in welfareb 
8.0  Employment 
Unemployment 
Market  output 
Home output 
Change in welfareb 
Competitive  islands 
Unemployment rate 
Avg. duration  of unem- 
ployment 




Avg. duration  of unem- 
ployment 
Incidence  of unemploy- 
ment 
5.3  4.8  4.2  3.5  2.4 
2.4  2.3  2.2  2.0  1.7 
















92.2  82.9  71.0  53.3 
83.5  65.8  46.1  23.5 
94.4  87.6  78.6  64.1 
125.8  155.9  193.7  249.3 
-0.3  -1.0  -2.2  -5.2 
97.6  94.6  90.4  83.1 
88.5  75.1  58.6  36.7 
97.9  95.3  91.7  85.2 
109.9  122.3  139.1  167.1 
-0.3  -0.7  -1.5  -3.7 
100.2  100.5  101.0  101.9 
90.8  79.8  65.5  44.9 
99.6  99.1  98.4  97.1 
101.2  102.2  103.6  104.2 





2.9  1.7 
1.8  1.5 









2.4  2.2  2.0  1.6 
a(Average  earnings  per union member)/(average  competitive  wages). 294 *  ALVAREZ  & VERACIERTO 
perfect  substitutes  and 60% of the islands  become  unionized,  the num- 
ber  of  agents  unemployed  (U) must  increase  by  115.9% before  agents 
again become  indifferent  between  participating  in market activities  and 
working  at home  [i.e. before equality  in equation  (8) is restored].  How- 
ever,  the  unemployment  rate increases  so much  that employment  falls 
by 16.1%. The fall in employment  dominates  the increase in the number 
of agents  unemployed,  leading  to a decrease  in labor-force participation 
and a consequent  increase  in home  production  of 28.4%. Market output 
falls  by  9.3% because  of  the  large  fall  in  employment.  Note  that  the 
effects  of unions  are qualitatively  similar to those  of minimum  wages, 
since both regimes  transfer rents from firms towards workers.  However, 
the  effects  of unions  are much  larger, since  minimum-wage  legislation 
extracts rents only when  the minimum  wage becomes  binding  (i.e.,  only 
wages  in  the  lower  tail of  the  distribution  are affected),  while  unions 
extract rents at all levels. 
When  y  =  8,  the  marginal  utility  of home  goods  increases  so  much 
when  market output  falls that agents  substitute  away  from home  activi- 
ties  to  sustain  the  level  of market  output.  In this  case,  the  labor-force 
participation  increases,  and  home  output  consequently  falls by  17.1%. 
The  increase  in  the  labor  force  is not  enough  to  outweigh  the  higher 
unemployment  rate, and employment  still falls by 3.3%. However,  mar- 
ket output  now  decreases  only by 0.7%. 
We find that the welfare  cost of unions  is extremely  large: when  y =  1 
and  60% of  the  islands  become  unionized,  the  welfare  loss  is 3.5% in 
terms of consumption. 
We now turn to the results under the union-boss  model,  as described in 
Table 3b.  We see  that  the  effects  are very  different  from  the  coalition 
model:  larger unionized  sectors  lead  to lower  unemployment  rates.  To 
understand  this difference, notice that in this case it is the union boss who 
retains all monopolistic  rents; workers  in the union  sector are paid only 
their opportunity  cost. As a consequence,  average wages  fall as the size of 
the  unionized  sector  increases.  With lower  average  wages,  both  union 
bosses  and  competitive  firms hire  more  workers,  and  unemployment 
rates  decrease  in  each  sector.  Observe  that  the  unemployment  rate is 
always higher in the unionized  sector than in the competitive  sector, since 
union  bosses  restrict the labor supply.  However,  the composition  effect 
doesn't dominate: unemployment  rates fall so rapidly in each sector as the 
degree  of unionization  increases  that the economy-wide  unemployment 
rate decreases.  In fact, as the fraction of islands  unionized  increases  to 
60%, the unemployment  rate decreases  from 5.3% to 3.5%. 
When  home  goods  and market goods  are perfect  substitutes  (y  =  0), 
the  fall in  average  wages  is  so  large  when  60% of the  islands  become Labor-Market  Policies  in an Equilibrium  Search  Model  *  295 
unionized  that the number  of agents  that search (U) must  fall by 53.9% 
before  agents  again become  indifferent  between  working  at home  and 
working  in the market [i.e.,  before equality  in equation  (8) is restored]. 
The fall in unemployment  is so large that employment  decreases by 29%, 
despite  the fall in the unemployment  rate. The consequent  reduction  in 
labor-force participation leads to an increase of 93.7% in home  output.  In 
contrast,  market output  decreases  by 21.4%. 
When  y = 8, the fall in market output  increases  the marginal utility of 
market goods  so much that agents  substitute  away from home  activities 
to  sustain  the  level  of market  output.  Even  though  this  effect  is large 
enough  to  increase  employment  by  1%, it  is  not  enough  to  increase 
labor-force participation: home  output  still increases,  but only by 3.6%. 
As a counterpart,  market output  decreases  by merely  1.6%. 
Notice  that even  though  unemployment  rates are lower,  the negative 
welfare  effects  of unions  are quite  large.  For instance,  with  60% of the 
labor force unionized  the welfare  cost of unions  is equivalent  to a 1.5% 
permanent  reduction  in consumption  under  y =  1. 
Since the two models  of unions predict such different effects on unem- 
ployment  rates, it is important to discuss  what evidence  favors one type 
of  model  over  the  other.  Note  that  in  the  coalition  model  of  unions, 
union  members  receive  higher  wages  than workers  in the  competitive 
sector.  The opposite  is true in the union-boss  model.  Thus,  an indirect 
test of the relative relevance of the two models  would  be provided  by the 
sign of the union  wage  premium  in the data. Card (1996) provides  such 
evidence.  Using  panel  data from the  1987 and 1988 Current Population 
Surveys,  he reported  that the union  wage  premium  is about 15% in the 
U.S.  economy.  The sign  of this premium  favors  the  coalition  model  of 
unions  over  the  union-boss  model.  However,  the  evidence  in favor is 
stronger  than this.  In order to obtain a wage  premium  of the magnitude 
reported  by  Card,  about  20% of  the  islands  must  be  unionized  (the 
generated  wage  premium  is 12.5%). Under  this degree  of unionization 
we verify that 13% of the work force is employed  in the unionized  sector. 
This is surprisingly  close to the empirical counterpart of 15.6% reported 
by Nickell (1997), providing  additional confidence  about the quantitative 
relevance  of the coalition model  of unions. 
6.3 FIRING  TAXES 
Table 4 shows  the effects of firing taxes that range between  3 months  and 
12 months  of average  wages.  To understand  these  results,  note  that in 
the presence  of firing taxes firms change their behavior in two important 
ways:  (1) they  become  less  willing  to fire workers  (as they  try to avoid 
current taxes),  and (2) they become  less willing  to hire workers  (as they 296 *  ALVAREZ  & VERACIERTO 
Table  4  EFFECTS  OF FIRING  TAXES 
Value 
Firing Taxa 
y  Quantity  Laissez-Faire  3.0  6.0  12.0 
Unemployment  rate  5.3  4.6  4.2  3.7 
Avg. duration  of unemp.  2.4  3.7  4.2  5.1 
Incidence  of unemp.  2.3  1.3  1.1  0.1 
0.0  Employment  100.0  93.7  90.1  86.1 
Unemployment  100.0  81.0  71.5  60.0 
Market  output  100.0  94.9  91.9  88.0 
Home output  100.0  121.6  133.7  147.3 
Change in welfareb  0.0  -0.6  -1.2  -2.3 
1.0  Employment  100.0  98.7  98.1  97.9 
Unemployment  100.0  85.3  77.8  68.2 
Market  output  100.0  98.1  97.0  95.5 
Home output  100.0  106.8  110.3  112.7 
Change in welfareb  0.0  -0.6  -1.2  -2.3 
8.0  Employment  100.0  101.2  102.1  103.9 
Unemployment  100.0  87.4  80.9  72.3 
Market  output  100.0  99.7  99.5  99.2 
Home output  100.0  98.5  96.6  91.8 
Change in welfareb  0.0  -0.6  -1.1  -2.1 
aIn  months of average  wages. 
bPercentage  of consumption,  with respect  to laissez-faire. 
try to avoid  future taxes).  These  effects  tend  to reduce  the incidence  of 
unemployment  and  increases  the  average  duration  of  unemployment, 
respectively.  Depending  on  which  effect  is  larger,  the  unemployment 
rate can decrease  or increase.  Under  our choice  of parameter values  we 
find that the effect on the firing rate dominates:  the unemployment  rate 
decreases  from  5.3% to  3.7% with  firing  taxes  equal  to  12 months  of 
wages. 
The  distortions  in  the  firing  and  hiring  process  introduced  by  the 
firing taxes reduce  the  productivity  in the islands  sector quite substan- 
tially. As a consequence  wages  fall considerably. When home  and market 
goods  are perfect substitutes  (y = 0), this induces  the number  of agents 
that search  for employment  to  decrease  by  40% before  agents  become 
indifferent  between  searching  and staying  at home.  The fall in the total 
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down  with it, despite  the decrease in the unemployment  rate. In particu- 
lar, employment  decreases  by  13.9%. The consequent  fall in labor-force 
participation  increases home  output  by 47.3%. On the other hand,  mar- 
ket output  decreases  by  12%, both  because  of the  decrease  in employ- 
ment  and because  of the  distortions  introduced  in the job reallocation 
process. 
When  y =  8, the  decrease  in market output  is so large that the  mar- 
ginal  utility  of market goods  increases  quite  dramatically. This induces 
agents to substitute  away from home  activities towards market activities. 
As a consequence  the total number  of agents  unemployed  falls by only 
16.7%. This is a small  decrease  compared  to that in the unemployment 
rate, leading to an increase in employment  of 3.9%. Labor-force participa- 
tion  increases  so  much  that  home  output  falls  by  7.2%.  In  contrast, 
market output  falls only by 0.8%. 
It  is  interesting  to  compare  our  results  with  those  obtained  by 
Hopenhayn  and Rogerson  (1993), who  calculated the costs of firing taxes 
in  a frictionless  economy  without  unemployment,  where  labor  could 
freely reallocate across production  units.  Since they considered  log pref- 
erences,  we restrict our discussion  to the case y =  1. 
Table 3 in Hopenhayn  and  Rogerson  (1993) reports  that a firing  tax 
equivalent  to one  year of wages  lowers  output  by 4.6%, decreases  em- 
ployment  by 2.5%, and lowers  welfare by 2.8% in terms of consumption 
in their model  economy.  Table 4 in this paper shows  that the same policy 
produces  a fall of 4.5% in  output,  a decrease  in employment  of 2.1%, 
and  a welfare  cost  of  2.3% in  our  model  economy.  These  results  are 
surprisingly  similar, and consequently  they are robust to the search fric- 
tions introduced.  However  they are not robust to the preference parame- 
ter y. As in Hopenhayn  and Rogerson  (1993), the effects  of firing taxes 
on  employment  and  output  depend  on  the  income  and  substitution 
effects on the labor supply.  If the substitution  effect dominates  (as in the 
case y = 0), employment  decreases; if the income  effect dominates  (as in 
the case y =  8), employment  increases. 
6.4 UNEMPLOYMENT  INSURANCE 
In Table 5 we analyze the effect of introducing  unemployment  compensa- 
tions  with  different  expected  discounted  value  of  benefits  into  the 
laissez-faire  economy.  We measure  the  generosity  of the  UI system  by 
the present  value  of UI benefits  p, given  by  K  b/(l  -  /3I), where  K  is the 
fraction of separations  that qualified  for UI benefits,  b is the number  of 
the benefits  per period,  r is the per-period  probability of maintaining  UI 
benefits,  and  3 is the reciprocal of the gross  interest  rate. In Table 5 we 298 *  ALVAREZ  & VERACIERTO 
Table  5  EFFECTS  OF UNEMPLOYMENT  BENEFITS 
Value 
Present Value of Unemployment 
Benefitsa 
y  Quantity  Laissez-Faire  0.28  0.50  0.75  1.00  1.25 
Unemployment 
rate 
Avg. duration  of 
unemployment 
Incidence  of unem- 
ployment 
0.0  Employment 
Unemployment 




1.0  Employment 
Unemployment 




8.0  Employment 
Unemployment 




5.3  6.2  7.3  9.1  11.9  15.0 
2.4  2.7  2.9  3.4  4.1  5.0 
















105.0  108.0  111.6  115.2  118.5 
125.5  153.3  201.9  279.4  377.8 
103.8  106.2  109.2  112.1  114.7 
81.2  68.0  49.5  26.5  0.7 
0.0  -0.3  -1.2  -3.0  -5.6 
101.2  101.7  102.2  102.7  103.3 
120.9  144.3  184.9  249.2  329.2 
101.4  102.2  103.2  104.2  105.1 
92.4  86.5  77.2  63.7  47.2 
0.0  -0.3  -1.0  -2.5  -4.6 
99.4  98.9  98.2  97.5  97.0 
118.8  140.3  177.6  236.4  309.0 
100.2  100.4  100.6  100.8  100.9 
98.7  96.4  91.6  82.5  70.2 
0.0  -0.2  -0.8  -2.1  -3.6 
aIn model  periods  of average wages. 
bPercentage of consumption,  with respect to laissez-faire. 
calculate  the equilibrium  for different values  of p, starting with  the one 
that corresponds  to our depiction  of U.S. policies  (see Section 5 above for 
the details).  Recall that for the U.S. we  select p to be 0.28 average model 
period  of wages,  where  the model  period equals one and a half months. 
The  other  values  of  p  considered  are  0.5,  0.75,  1.0,  and  1.25  model 
periods  of wages. 
As  the  size  of the  UI benefits  increases,  workers  are more willing  to 
leave an island after a bad shock. This increases the rate of incidence  into 
unemployment.  On the other hand,  there are two effects on the average Labor-Market  Policies  in an Equilibrium  Search  Model  *  299 
duration  of  unemployment.  First,  agents  tend  to  accept  employment 
more  easily,  since  they  obtain  eligiblity  for UI benefits.  This leads  to a 
decrease  in average  duration.  Second,  since searching  for a job becomes 
more attractive than staying  at home  without  UI benefits,  the number of 
agents  that search (U) must increase until agents are once again indiffer- 
ent between  the two  activities  [i.e.,  equality  in equation  (8) is restored]. 
This leads  to an increase  in the  average  duration  of unemployment.  In 
Table 5 we  observe  that this general equilibrium  effect dominates:  larger 
UI benefits  increase  the average  duration of unemployment.  Since both 
the  rate  of  incidence  and  the  average  duration  of  unemployment  in- 
crease, the unemployment  rate increases quite substantially.  We see that 
a present  value  of UI benefits  equivalent  to one  model  period  of wages 
increases  the unemployment  rate from 5.3% to 11.9%. 
When  market goods  and home  goods  are perfect  substitutes  (y  =  0), 
the general-equilibrium  effect described  above is large: the total number 
of unemployed  (U) increases by 179.4% on moving  from laissez-faire to a 
present  value  of UI benefits  equivalent  to 1 model  period of wages.  This 
increase in the total number of unemployed  is so important that employ- 
ment increases  by 15.2% despite  the increase in the unemployment  rate. 
This  leads  to  such  an  increase  in  labor-force  participation  that  home 
output  falls by 73.5%. Market output  increases by 12.1%. 
Under  y  =  8, the higher market output  decreases  the marginal utility 
of market goods,  inducing  agents  to substitute  away from market activi- 
ties. As a consequence,  the total number of unemployed  (U) increases by 
a more  moderate  136.4%,  and  employment  falls  by  2.5%.  The  lower 
labor-force participation dampens  the fall in home  output to only 17.5%. 
On the other hand,  market output  increases by merely  0.8%. 
The welfare  costs of introducing  UI benefits  are quite large: a present 
value  of  UI  benefits  equivalent  to  1  model  period  of  wages  reduces 
welfare by 2.5% in terms of consumption  under  y =  1. 
7. A Comparison  with  the  Empirical  Evidence 
We end  the paper by contrasting  our results with  some  of the empirical 
evidence  available on the effect of different policies/regimes. 
7.1 MINIMUM  WAGES 
While  empirical  studies  for the U.S.  economy  have  traditionally  found 
that  minimum  wages  affect  teenage  employment  with  an elasticity  of 
about  -0.1,  the evidence  has become  more tenuous  over time (see Card 
and Krueger, 1995). The evidence  that minimum  wages  affect adult em- 300 *  ALVAREZ  & VERACIERTO 
ployment  is  even  weaker,  suggesting  that minimum  wages  have  little 
effect on the aggregate  unemployment  rate and employment  level. 
Card and Krueger (1995) observe  that in the U.S.  economy  only 5% of 
workers  are paid  the  minimum  wage.  Since  in  Table 2a the  economy 
with a minimum  wage  equal to 80% of average wages  generates a similar 
proportion  of recipients,  we  identify  it with  the U.S.12 Given  the  small 
differences  between  that economy  and laissez-faire,  we  find our results 
to be broadly consistent  with  the empirical evidence. 
While a large empirical  literature has investigated  the effects  of mini- 
mum  wages  on  income  inequality,  our model  is not well  suited  to  ad- 
dress  those  issues.  The only  heterogeneity  that our model  generates  is 
due  to time variation  in wages:  all agents  face the same  stochastic  pro- 
cess  for wages.  As a consequence,  the wage  distribution  that the model 
produces  is more concentrated  than the data (the standard  deviation  of 
wages  in the benchmark U.S. case is only 13%). To analyze distributional 
issues  we  would  have  to incorporate  different  income  groups,  but that 
would  complicate  the model considerably  and is outside  the scope of this 
paper. 
7.2. UNIONS 
In Section  6.2 we  argued  in favor of the coalition  model  of unions  over 
the union-boss  model,  due to its ability to generate jointly an empirically 
relevant  union  wage  premium  and  degree  of  unionization.  We  now 
compare  its predictions  with  some  of the estimates  found  in the empiri- 
cal literature. 
Nickell  (1997) reports  that  union  densities  vary widely  across  coun- 
tries: from 9.8% in France and  11% in Spain,  up to 72% in Finland and 
82.5% in Sweden.  Table 3a considered  degrees  of unionization  on  this 
range and found  that the effect is to increase  unemployment  rates from 
7.1% to 16.3%. We consider  the magnitude  of these  effects  to be consis- 
tent  with  empirical  findings.  In particular,  the  coefficients  in Nickell's 
regressions  indicate  that the  elasticity  of the  unemployment  rate with 
respect  to union  density  is about 0.48.  The corresponding  elasticity  un- 
derlying  Table 3a is 0.38, which  is very close to Nickell's  estimate.13 
Nickell's  regression  coefficients  also indicate  an elasticity  of employ- 
ment  relative to union  density  of about  -0.05.  Di Tella and MacCulloch 
12. In order  for 5%  of workers  to be subject  to the minimum  wage, the minimum  wage has 
to be 80%  of average wages in the model economy. In the U.S. the minimum wage is 
only 26%  of average  wages (see Card  and Krueger,  1995).  The reason  for the difference 
is that the wage distribution  is more concentrated  in the model than in the data. See the 
comments in the next paragraph. 
13. We calculated  each of the elasticities of change relative to the economy with 20%  of 
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(1999) provide  a similar estimate.  As has been previously  discussed,  the 
corresponding  elasticity in the model economy  depends  on the substitut- 
ability between  home and market goods given by the parameter y. For y = 
1 the model  elasticity  is -0.03,  which  is also close  to Nickell's  estimate. 
7.3 FIRING  TAXES 
Table 4 reported the effects of firing taxes between  three months  and one 
year  of  wages.  We  saw  that  firing  taxes  equal  to  one  year  of  wages 
decreased  the  unemployment  rate  from  5.3% to  3.7% and  decreased 
employment  by  2.1% in  the  benchmark  case  (y  =  1).  These  are large 
effects.  However,  firing taxes equal to one year of wages  are large com- 
pared to observed  policies  in OECD countries.  Table 6 reports the sum of 
advance-notice  and severance  payments  (adjusted  for tenure)  as multi- 
ples  of  average  model-period  wages.  According  to  this  measure,  one 
year of firing taxes (equal to 8 model periods)  is at the upper end of what 
is observed.14 
Ths sign of the relation between  unemployment  rate and firing taxes in 
the model economy  is consistent with Nickell's results: in his regression of 
unemployment  rate he finds  a negative  coefficient  on a measure  of em- 
ployment  protection.  On the other hand,  Lazear (1990) reports a positive 
coefficient for severance payments.  Neither of the two coefficients is statis- 
tically  significantly  different  from zero.  Di Tella and MacCulloch  (1999) 
find  a negative  effect of labor-market flexibility on unemployment  rate, 
controlling  for random effects, but the result is not significant when  they 
control for both country and year fixed effects. 
Nickell  (1997), Lazear (1990), and Di Tella and MacCulloch (1999) find 
that  larger employment  protection  reduces  aggregate  employment.  In 
our model  economy,  the sign  of that relation  depends  on the degree  of 
substitution  between  home  and market goods.  However,  for the bench- 
mark economy  (y =  1) we find a negative  relation. Lazear (1990) reports 
that moving  from laissez-faire  to three  months  of severance  payments 
reduces  the  employment-population  ratio by  about  1%. In our bench- 
mark case  of  y  =  1 we  find  that three  months  of severance  payments 
reduce the employment-population  ratio from 73.6% to 72.7%, which  is 
consistent  with  Lazear's estimate. 
14. Moreover,  as  explained  at  the  end  of  the  next  subsection,  in  the  model  economy 
severance  payments  can be  undone  perfectly.  To the  extent  that in actual economies 
severance  payments  can be partially undone,  the relevant  measure  of firing taxes will 
be lower  than shown  in Table 6. For instance,  if severance  payments  could be undone 
perfectly,  firing  taxes  would  only  include  expected  legal  costs  of litigation.  For Ger- 
many, Italy, France, and the United  Kingdom,  Bentolila and Bertola (1990) report that 
these  costs  are well below  one month  of wages. Table 6  GENEROSITY OF UI BENEFITS AND  FIRING TAXES 
Monthly  Present 
Maximum  Benefit  Hazard  Value of  Estimated  Present Value 
Duration of  Recipients  per  out of  Replacement  Unemployment  Severance  of "Net" UI 
Country  Benefitsa  Unemployed  Unemploymentb  Ratioc  Benefitsd,e  Paymentsdf  Benefitsd 
Belgium  32.00  1.48  0.08  0.66  7.88  1.52  6.36 
Canada  7.69  1.29  0.26  0.67  2.23  NA  NA 
Denmark  19.85  1.13  0.19  0.73  2.73  0.46  2.27 
Finland  16.00  1.12  0.13  0.75  4.23  NA  NA 
France  19.85  0.98  0.03  0.71  6.75  6.31  0.44 
Germany  7.94  0.89  0.09  0.71  2.78  1.38  1.40 
Ireland  9.92  1.07  0.03  0.64  3.11  0.00  3.11 
Italy  3.97  NA  0.09  0.47  NA  9.41  NA 
Japan  4.62  0.36  0.13  0.42  0.78  0.00  0.78 
Netherlands  23.82  1.05  0.05  0.77  8.70  1.33  7.37 
Portugal  8.60  0.41  0.14  NA  NA  3.45  NA 
Spain  15.88  0.59  0.02  0.75  5.76  4.16  1.60 
Sweden  9.23  0.93  0.17  0.84  3.10  0.51  2.59 
Switzerland  7.69  0.53  NA  0.89  NA  0.67  NA 
U.K.  8.00  0.71  0.09  0.51  2.01  0.60  1.41 
U.S.  4.00  0.34  0.34  0.68  0.45  0.00  0.45 
aIn model  periods; from Table 7.2 in OECD Jobs Study  (1994). 
bMonthly flow  rate out of unemployment  for ages 25-54  from Table 1.9 in OECD,  Employment  Outlook, 1995 (most recent  year). 
cFrom  Table  2.1 in OECD,  Employment  Outlook,  1996  (net replacement  rates at APW  level of earnings  for couple with two children). 
dIn  model periods  of average  wages. 
eComputed as p =  bK(1 -  3i/). 
fSum of severance  and advance-notice  payments  (Lazear, 1990), in month's  wages.  The severance  payments,  given by Lazear at 10 years' tenure,  are adjusted 
to median  tenure as given  in Table 5.5 of OECD,  Employment  Outlook, 1995. Labor-Market  Policies  in an Equilibrium  Search  Model  *  303 
7.4 UNEMPLOYMENT  INSURANCE 
Table 5 reported  how  changes  in the present  value  of UI benefits  affect 
unemployment  rates  and  employment  levels.  We found  large  effects. 
But the present  values  considered  ranged  up to 5 times  the benchmark 
value  for the U.S.  economy.  While we  evaluated  relatively large present 
values  of UI benefits,  we  consider  that the responsiveness  of the model 
to UI benefits  is within  what the empirical evidence  suggests. 
Nickell  (1997) reports regression  coefficients  that imply an elasticity of 
the unemployment  rate, with respect to the UI-benefit replacement  ratio, 
of about 0.62.  The average  elasticity  in Table 5 is 0.34,  which  is smaller 
than Nickell's  estimate,  but is of the right order of magnitude.  Observe 
that our theory predicts that the elasticity of the unemployment  rate with 
respect  to the  replacement  ratio is the  same  as with  respect  to benefit 
duration  [see equation  (13)]. The elasticity  that Nickell  reports with  re- 
spect to benefit duration is about 0.20, which is lower than his estimated 
elasticity  with  respect to the replacement  ratio. However,  his coefficient 
on benefit  duration is estimated  with  a larger standard deviation. 
The elasticity  of employment  with  respect  to UI benefits  in Nickell's 
calculations  is  -0.02.15  While the results  in the model  economy  depend 
on the substitutability  between  market and home  goods,  for the bench- 
mark economy  (y  =  1) the  average  elasticity  in Table 5 is  -0.01.  This 
elasticity is lower than Nickell's  estimate but again is of the correct order 
of magnitude. 
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their practical application to policy analysis.  Alvarez and Veracierto (AV) 
provide  one  of the  first quantitative  and comprehensive  evaluations  of 
labor-market policies  in a general-equilibrium  search environment.  Their 
model  combines  ideas  from two  parallel traditions,  the  Lucas-Prescott 
(1974) island  model  and  the  matching or flow approach  to labor markets 
(e.g.,  Blanchard  and  Diamond,  1990,  or  Mortensen  and  Pissarides, 
1994). Although  closer in spirit to the former, AV also pursue  normative 
goals  that have  attracted special  attention  in the latter part of the litera- 
ture.  I find  this modeling  choice  very  appropriate  for investigating  the 
four labor-market policies  of interest (albeit unions  are better described 
as institutions  than as policies). 
The  main  innovation  in  AV  is  the  simultaneous  consideration  of 
the  three  labor-market states-employment,  unemployment,  and non- 
participation-as  well  as of the elasticity  of labor supply.  Such ingredi- 
ents  appear  in  different  combinations  in previous  contributions  to the 
literature,  but  their  full  interaction  with  labor-market  policies  has 
hardly been  explored  from a quantitative  viewpoint,  in general  equilib- 
rium,  or  with  heterogeneous  production  units.  On  methodological 
grounds,  AV build  upon  a classical  theoretical  framework  to obtain  an 
efficient  algorithm  for quantitative  analysis,  fully  illustrated  in  a com- 
panion  paper  (1999). The exercise  presented  here  is elegant,  well  exe- 
cuted,  and clearly explained. 
I find the results of these  experiments  greatly informative  as far as the 
minimum  wage  and,  to  a more  limited  extent,  unions  are concerned. 
The  insights  that  this  exercise  offers  are still  limited  on  three  dimen- 
sions.  First, most  interesting  welfare  effects of labor-market policies  are 
shut  down  ex ante. Second,  AV follow  the  literature and  posit  without 
regrets a random-matching  technology,  which  appears  somewhat  artifi- 
cial in the  context  of the  economy  they  describe,  and  of course  deter- 
mines  in part the outcome  of the policy experiments.  Third, the equilib- 
rium  that  emerges  from  their  simulations,  meant  to  replicate  salient 
aspects  of the  U.S.  economy,  looks  "stiff": Compared  with  the  magni- 
tudes  that macroeconomists  have  learned  to consider  normal,  churning 
and  ongoing  reallocation  appear  subdued.  The  absence  of  aggregate 
shocks  certainly  plays  a major role  in  this  respect.  In this  comment  I 
elaborate  further  on  these  three  points,  and  then  indicate  how  they 
affect the results of each policy experiment. 
2.  Insurance  and  Welfare  Analysis 
Simulations  of a structural equilibrium model  anchored to data have two 
advantages  over standard econometric analysis: They avoid identification 
fallacies,  and they  allow  welfare  evaluation.  Eventually,  AV refer to the 306 *  MOSCARINI 
findings  of some empirical literature to corroborate their results. But their 
most interesting  message  is the magnitude  of welfare consequences.  It is 
then unfortunate  that they account for only part of the social costs and for 
none  of the benefits  of the labor-market policies  in question. 
Costs would be greatly enhanced by the presence  of capital. The substi- 
tution  of  capital  for labor by  firms would  amplify  the  impact  of these 
policies  on labor participation and unemployment.  This is in fact a major 
theme of the current debate on Euorpean unemployment.  It is fair to say, 
however,  that such an extension  would  be highly  nontrivial. 
It is equally  fair to say that the main goal of these  institutions,  at least 
in  the  minds  of  the  policymakers  who  promote  them,  is  to  provide 
insurance  against  idiosyncratic  labor-market uncertainty.  In AV's world 
this  is  a nonissue,  as  workers  have  access  to  employment  lotteries  to 
diversify away this risk. I do not begrudge  the tractability granted by this 
assumption,  but one is left wondering  about the meaning  of the welfare 
analysis.  AV claim  to have  dismissed  important  insurance  effects  in a 
companion  paper; but this claim must depend  on the degree  of idiosyn- 
cratic risk that workers  face,  which  is rather scant  in the  essay  of this 
volume.  The  relevance  of  this  issue  is  witnessed  by  the  fast-growing 
literature  on  the  macroeconomic  consequences  of  uninsurable  labor- 
market risk. 
A similar role to lotteries  is played  by the assumption  of competitive 
wage  setting  at the  local (island) level,  from Lucas and Prescott  (1974). 
Without  wage  bargaining  (the standard  assumption  in the other strand 
of  equilibrium  search  literature),  AV  avoid  altogether  the  familiar 
congestion-type  externalities.  To many  readers,  decreasing  returns  to 
scale and perfect competition  may appear a virtue of the model.  Yet, by 
their very  nature,  search  frictions  do  generate  rents,  and labor-market 
policies  appear more interesting  in nonefficient  scenarios.  But this may 
be a matter of taste. 
It is less  disputable  that competitive  wage  setting  appears  somewhat 
artificial in the absence  of entry by firms into the island.  It is natural to 
expect  that, in each island,  the fixed number  of firms extract rents from 
the variable population  of workers  who  happen  to land there and then 
face a cost to move  out. With no free entry, the value  of a vacancy net of 
capital costs  cannot be always  zero.  Indeed,  workers  effectively  prepay 
for the firing tax through  a 1:1 reduction  in the competitive  wage. 
3.  Undirected  Search 
Search  models  explicitly  recognize  the  importance  of heterogeneity  in 
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of heterogeneity  among  agents  and  technologies.  AV are no  exception, 
allowing  for idiosyncratic  productivity  shocks  and  uneven  distribution 
of  employment  across  islands,  as well  as  for partial  unionization  and 
varying UI eligibility  status among  workers.  This trend in the literature, 
however,  has not been matched by a corresponding  sophistication  in the 
description  of the search technology.  In the model  that AV propose,  as in 
most of its predecessors,  workers cannot direct their effort to locate more 
productive  or unionized  jobs,  not even  in a noisy  way.  This simplifica- 
tion,  analogous  to random  matching,  has served  the equilibrium search 
literature well,  but I take this occasion  to say that it is time to move  on 
and  explore  the  implications  of richer allocation  mechanisms.  The first 
attempts  in this direction  go back at least to Salop's  (1973) discussion  of 
systematic  job  search  in partial equilibrium;  Lucas and  Prescott  (1974) 
themselves  sketch an analysis  of directed  search in general equilibrium. 
Since then,  technical advances  in the solution  and simulation  of equilib- 
rium models  have made it possible  to manage  successfully  other projects 
of similar complexity,  so I believe  this exploration  should  now  resume. 
As  for any  polar  case  in theoretical  analysis,  undirected  search  pro- 
vides  useful  insights  into  more  realistic  descriptions  of  the  matching 
process.  But,  absent  a comprehensive  investigation,  it is  hard  to  con- 
clude  that  partially  directed  search  would  simply  result  in  a  convex 
combination  of Walrasian frictionless  economies  and random matching. 
The possibility  of steering job search towards  more attractive labor mar- 
kets is an extra margin that responds  autonomously  to the introduction 
of  the  four  policies  and  simply  does  not  exist  in  either  polar  case.  In 
Moscarini  (1998) I investigate  a frictional  two-sector  ecnomy  where  ex 
ante heterogeneous  workers  and  firms may  choose  to be  more  or less 
selective  in their search, both on and off the job. Agents  on both sides  of 
the markets adjust their search strategies  to both sectoral and aggregate 
productivity  shocks,  and they  do so in a systematic  way  that moderates 
the  response  of  unemployment  duration.  For instance,  in  bad  times 
workers become  less selective  and probe a wider range of jobs, reducing 
match quality but also the unemployment  rate. It is reasonable  to expect 
similar implications  from the introduction  of labor-market policies.  I will 
discuss  later in some  detail  the  consequences  of directed  search in the 
AV model  of unions. 
4.  Churning  Intensity  and  Other  Calibration  Issues 
The third major point I wish  to raise concerns the amount of reallocation 
emerging  from  the  numerical  experiments.  I find  the  choice  of  four 
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light of available empirical evidence  for the United States. The Bureau of 
Labor Statistics  CPS  series  indicate  13  weeks  for  the  whole  postwar 
period,  and 15 weeks  for the post-oil-shock  period.  The upward  trend in 
U.S.  unemployment  duration,  documented  by Murphy  and Topel in the 
1987 NBER Macroeconomics  Annual,  has  since  then  leveled  out  and,  if 
anything,  mildly reversed,  as manifest  for example  from the series men- 
tioned  above.  The choice  of 17 weeks  is representative  of the first half of 
the 1990s, and leads to a rather "stiff" picture of the economy.  The other 
source  of  rigidity  is  the  absence  of  search  while  employed,  a  major 
component  of worker  turnover.  The very  low  incidence  of unemploy- 
ment that AV obtain from their experiments  is the other side of the same 
coin.  These  choices  thus  imply  a high  persistence  and  low  variance  of 
idiosyncratic  shocks,  with  intuitive  consequences  for policy  evaluation 
that I will take up shortly. 
The other open end of the calibration is the utility curvature parameter 
y. A value  y =  8 may appear high,  and indeed  the results of the experi- 
ments conducted  under this assumption  are the least appealing,  leading 
the  authors  to  select  y  =  1 as  the  benchmark  value.  But  in  fact  the 
procedure that delivers  y = 8, based on equation  (16), is perfectly reason- 
able  and  suggests  an even  higher  number.  Since  r/(1 -  r) is a convex 
function  of the labor tax rate T E [0,1], which  is known  to vary substan- 
tially across  countries,  by Jensen's  inequality  the  implied  value  of  -y is 
larger than the above value  8 obtained by simply  substituting  into equa- 
tion  (16) the empirical  average  of r (50%). In any event,  AV conduct  an 
excellent  robustness  analysis  on  y,  but  cannot  find  much  robustness. 
Unfortunately,  this brings us back to the beginning:  we  are left to evalu- 
ate  the  quantitative  performance  of  a macromodel  on  the  basis  on  a 
labor-supply-type  preference  parameter,  which  is hardly  pinned  down 
unambiguously  by  different  calibrating  procedures.  In  particular,  as 
usual,  micro and macro data suggest  quite different numbers. 
I now  turn to policy  modeling  and numerical  experiments.  The mini- 
mum-wage  exercise  is quite convincing,  both in its implementation  and 
in its results,  so  I will  limit my  comments  to the other  three  exercises. 
5.  Unions 
I restrict attention  to the coalition  model  of unions,  which  I consider  the 
empirically  relevant one.  A union  is a local monopolist  of labor that sets 
quantity and lets the wage  adjust. In the real world unions  often bargain 
for a wage  rate, conditional  on securing  employment  for their members. 
The  authors'  choice  shifts  action  from  the  employment  margin  to  the Comment 309 
wage  margin,  and yet  the effects  of unions  on the former are "surpris- 
ingly large" in their experiments. 
One  way  to dampen  these  effects  is to introduce  directed job search, 
which  should  drive  union  membership  up  and  dilute  rents.  Suppose 
workers  may  direct their job search towards  unionized  islands,  as long 
as a wage premium is paid there, still bearing the same opportunity  costs 
of search, namely  discounting  and home production.  The Bellman equa- 
tion for the value  of joblessness  0 reduces  to 
0 = max  wh +  130,13  (dx x  dz),,/  v(x,z)i(dx  x  dz)  , 
the  three  possibilities  corresponding  to home  production,  search  for a 
unionized  job,  and  search for a competitive  job.  Ceteris paribus, 0 obvi- 
ously  rises (compare the Bellman equation  above with the equation  for 0 
in AV's Section 4.2).  Labor participation  also rises,  as job search gains  a 
"technological  edge"  over home  production.  The higher  0 also sustains 
the value  of being  employed  in both unionized  [u; cf. AV's equation  (9)] 
and competitive  [v, equation  (1)] islands,  a familiar feedback that contrib- 
utes  to  raising  0 further.  As  a consequence,  unemployed  workers  in- 
crease  their  reservation  wage,  and  the  marginal  productivity  of  labor 
must  rise in competitive  islands.  Workers must  then  relocate  to union- 
ized islands  until indifferent between  the two subsectors,  as equilibrium 
requires  continuous  arrivals  to  competitive  islands  (see  Alvarez  and 
Veracierto,  1999). In conclusion,  it is natural  to expect  a less  dramatic 
employment  reduction  than the one we observe in the union experiment 
with  undirected  search. 
Instead,  a new  distortion  originates  from  the  incentives  that unions 
provide  for outsiders  to become  insiders,  rather than (say) pursue  their 
natural  talents  or human-capital  accumulation.  Although  outside  the 
scope  of  this  paper,  this  and  other  important  consequences  of  labor- 
market  institutions  are  obliterated  by  the  assumption  of  undirected 
search. 
6. Firing  Taxes 
Just as in Bentolila and Bertola (1990), firing taxes discourage  firms from 
both firing and hiring,  with  opposite  effects  on unemployment,  but the 
first effect always  dominates.  It is useful  to learn that these  well-known 
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In quantitative terms, the benchmark configuration  of parameters pre- 
dicts a mild impact of empirically plausible  firing taxes (cf. Section  7.3 of 
AV) on the unemployment  rate, while  again welfare  changes  are sizable 
but  do  not  take insurance  benefits  into  account.  Hence,  one  would  be 
tempted  to deem  excessive  the  time  and energy  currently  spent  in Eu- 
rope debating  the reform of firing restrictions. 
I suspect  that  such  weak  unemployment  effects  depend  to  a  large 
extent  on  the  high  persistence  of idiosyncratic  shocks,  which  skew  to- 
ward  zero  the  distribution  of  employment  adjustments  in  the  laissez- 
faire economy,  thus  reducing  the  "bite" of firing taxes.  Indeed,  a major 
concern  in  many  European  countries  is  that  firing  restrictions  make 
firms totally unwilling  to hire in the face of temporary  and even  predict- 
able changes  in profitability,  choking  off exit from unemployment  and 
giving  rise to long-term  joblessness.  Not  surprisingly,  proposals  to re- 
duce firing costs  go hand  in hand with  the promotion  of part-time jobs. 
In addition,  both this model  and Hopenhayn  and Rogerson  (1993), who 
found similar responses,  abstract from aggregate shocks with their transi- 
tory components. 
Although  an  average  unemployment  duration  of  17 weeks  may  ap- 
pear  too  low  for several  European  countries,  this  number  refers  to  an 
unobservable  laissez-faire  economy.  The actual magnitudes  could as well 
originate  from  less  persistent  shocks  that  amplify  the  impact  of  firing 
restrictions,  a different  image from the one depicted  by AV. 
7.  Unemployment  Insurance  (UI) 
In the absence  of uninsured  unemployment  risk, unemployment  bene- 
fits  amount  to  search  subsidies  because  employment  is  necessary  to 
regain UI eligibility. The authors choose  to fund unemployment  benefits 
with  a lump-sum  tax levied  on  each  worker  irrespective  of  her  labor- 
market status,  rather than (more realistically) only on active jobs, say on 
wages  and  profits.  This  feature  reduces  the  relative  desirability  of 
nonemployment  over  employment,  understating  the  impact  of  UI on 
unemployment  duration  and rate. In spite  of this bias,  the model  exag- 
gerates the aggregate  implications  of UI vis a vis the available empirical 
evidence. 
AV also show  analytically that unemployment  benefits and firing taxes 
offset  each  other.  Again,  an  employment  tax on  wages  and/or  profits 
would  compound,  rather than  neutralize,  the  incentives  to unemploy- 
ment provided  by UI. Comment  *  311 
REFERENCES 
Alvarez, E, and M. Veracierto.  (1999).  Equilibrium  search and labor  market  poli- 
cies:  A theoretical  analysis.  University  of Chicago.  Unpublished  Working  Paper. 
Bentolila,  S., and G. Bertola.  (1990).  Firing  costs and labor  demand:  How bad is 
Eurosclerosis?  Review  of Economic  Studies  57(3):381-402. 
Blanchard,  0.,  and P Diamond. (1990).  The cyclical  behavior  of the gross flows 
of U.S. workers. Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity  2:85-155. 
Hopenhayn, H., and R. Rogerson. (1993).  Job  turnover  and policy evlauation:  A 
general  equilibrium  analysis. Journal  of Political  Economy  101(5):915-938. 
Lucas, R., and E. C. Prescott. (1974). Equilibrium  search and unemployment. 
Journal  of Economic  Theory  7(2):188-209. 
Mortensen,  D., and C. Pissarides. (1994).  Job  creation  and job destruction  in the 
theory of unemployment. Review  of Economic  Studies  61(3):397-415. 
Moscarini,  G. (1998).  Excess worker reallocation.  Dept. of Economics, Yale  Uni- 
versity.  Mimeo. 
Murphy,  K., and R. Topel.  (1987).  The evolution of unemployment  in the United 
States:  1968-1985.  In NBER  Macroeconomics  Annual  1987,  S. Fischer  (ed.). Cam- 
bridge, MA: MIT  Press. 
Salop, S. (1973). Systematic job search and unemployment. Review  of Economic 
Studies,  40:191-201. 
Comment 
ALAN B. KRUEGER 
Princeton  University 
This paper provides  a model with homogeneous  production  by homoge- 
neous  workers with homogeneous  tastes on different islands  that are hit 
by random shocks.  In commenting  on this paper, I have to confess  that I 
feel  a little  like  I've  landed  on  a different  kind  of  island-where  the 
workers  use a different production  technology  and possibly  have differ- 
ent tastes.  Nonetheless,  I think it is healthy  for the economic  science  to 
have  many  islands  that  employ  different  techniques,  and  to  have  the 
workers visit each others' islands  from time to time. 
I have  two  types  of comments  on  this  paper.  The first concerns  the 
modeling  assumptions;  I will try to relate what we've  learned from micro 
studies  about  the  type  of  model  the  authors  have  assumed,  and  the 
parameter values  they build into the model.  The second  involves  evaluat- 
ing the models'  predictions  in light of the available evidence. 
I have  little quarrel with  the elasticities  the authors have  assumed.  If 
used  in the right model,  these  seem  quite sensible  to me,  and consistent 
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with  the consensus  of thought  among  mainstream  labor economists.1  I 
also  like  the  fact that the  authors  make  employee  search  a prominent 
feature  of  their  model;  this  also  seems  consistent  with  many  of  the 
findings  in  the  labor  literature.  What  seems  more  problematic  to  me, 
however,  is that the  authors  have  disregarded  employer  search. Workers 
are presumed  to show  up at employers'  doorsteps  without  so much as a 
help-wanted  ad.  Firms never  have  vacancies  in the  model  the  authors 
employ.  This seems  inconsistent  with  an important feature of labor mar- 
kets.  Moreover,  it  is  a  modeling  assumption  that  matters,  because  it 
implies  that the  elasticity  of labor supply  to firms is infinite.  I think  it 
would  be  more  realistic  and  appropriate  to model  the  labor market as 
entailing  both  employer-  and  employee-side  search  frictions,  and  to 
have the duration and incidence  of vacancies  at individual  firms depend 
on the generosity  of the compensation  they offer. 
Burdett  and  Mortensen  (1998) and  Dickens,  Machin,  and  Manning 
(1999), for example,  provide  search models  in which  employers  cannot 
instantly  and costlessly  fill their vacancies.  As a result, these  papers find 
that a wage  floor that is modestly  above  the prevailing  wage  (e.g.,  im- 
posed  by  a  government  minimum  wage  or  union)  can  actually  raise 
employment.  In essence,  the firm-side  search costs bestow  employers- 
even  small employers-a  small degree  of monopsony  power,  since they 
can fill their vacancies  more quickly if they pay a higher wage.2 But, as in 
a static Joan Robinson  monopsony  model,  employers  would  not choose 
to  pay  a higher  wage  voluntarily,  because  they  already  employ  some 
workers,  and it is not profitable to offer a higher wage  to everyone.  Also, 
as in static monopsony  models,  if the mandated  wage  is too high,  em- 
ployers  would  return  to  their  demand  curve  and  choose  to  fill fewer 
jobs. This type of model  predicts  an inverted-V-shaped  pattern between 
employment  and the wage  floor and can explain other phenomena,  such 
as a firm-size wage  premium. 
The asymmetric treatment of search frictions in this paper casts some of 
the  policies  the  authors  examine  in as unflattering  a light  as possible. 
Nonetheless,  the  simulation  results  are rather encouraging  for some  of 
the policies.  It is not unusual  that I receive papers in the mail that report 
finding  "very small employment  effects of the minimum  wage,"  as this 
paper  does.  But it is unusual  that I receive  such papers  with  return ad- 
dresses in Chicago. Even setting the minimum wage at 85% of the average 
1. For  evidence  on  the  consensus  labor  supply  and  demand  elasticities,  see  Fuchs, 
Krueger,  and  Poterba  (1998).  The  authors'  assumed  labor  supply  elasticity  of  0.18, 
though  low, is higher  than the median  estimate  among  labor economists. 
2. One might  think that the current model,  with just one employer  per island,  would  be a 
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wage  (which  is more than twice the U.S.  level in 1998), the authors  find 
that  employment  is  unchanged  from  the  no-minimum-wage  counter- 
factual. And,  as I stated above,  the model  the authors employ  is likely to 
exaggerate the distortionary effect of a minimum  wage.  I think a valuable 
extension  of this work would  be to calculate the welfare effects of a mini- 
mum  wage  for workers  and  capital  owners.  My  suspicion  is  that  the 
authors will find that the minimum  wage  raises low-wage  workers' wel- 
fare because  their employment  hardly  changes,  although  their pay  in- 
creases substantially. 
An interesting  implication  of the authors' island-based  model  is that it 
implies  a substantial  spike at the minimum  wage.  Actual wage  distribu- 
tions  clearly  display  such  a  spike.  This  finding,  which  only  became 
known  after  microdata  were  available,  was  not  predicted  by  George 
Stigler  and  early  neoclassical  critiques  of  the  minimum  wage.  Stigler 
(1946), for example,  expected  wage  distributions  to be truncated  at the 
minimum. 
The analysis  of unions  could  have  benefited  from a stronger  connec- 
tion to the previous  literature. There is a tradition in labor economics  of 
general-equilibrium  analysis  of unions  (see,  for example,  Johnson  and 
Mieszkowski,  1970), and  I would  have  been  interested  in the  authors' 
perspective  on  how  their  results  extend  this  literature.  Moreover,  the 
union-boss  model  strikes me as equivalent  to the efficient-bargains litera- 
ture (see Oswald,  1985, for a survey).  There are also additional  alterna- 
tive views  of unions,  such  as the voice model. 
In any event,  the U.S.  union penetration  rate has been steadily  declin- 
ing for the last 25 years, and is currently below  10% in the private sector. 
The authors  simulate  the  effect  of unions  on the economy,  assuming  a 
union  penetration  rate  between  20% and  80%.3 I would  have  found 
some simulation  results for a union rate of around 10% useful,  especially 
since the results presented  suggest  that the percentage  of islands  union- 
ized  has  a nonlinear  effect  on  the  outcomes  of interest.  Cross-country 
studies  often find that unions  are associated  with better macroeconomic 
outcomes  when  the institutional  structure is such that unions  bargain at 
a national  level. 
The  assumptions  of  random  eligibility  for  UI benefits  and  random 
duration of benefits  strike me as more simplistic  and artificial than neces- 
sary. For example,  in the United  States,  a worker generally  must work a 
certain number  of quarters to qualify for 26 weeks  of UI benefits.  Why 
not build this into the model  and allow for endogenous  UI participation? 
3. I presume  that if X% of islands  are unionized,  approximately  X% of workers  are also 
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Furthermore,  the split treatment of UI benefits  and the firing tax strikes 
me as odd.  Since in practice in the United  States UI benefits  are funded 
by  an experience-rated  tax on  employers  (akin to the  firing tax in this 
model),  it was  not  clear to  me  that  anything  is  gained  by  treating  UI 
benefits  and firing costs separately. 
In any event,  my impression  is that the generosity  and duration  of UI 
benefits  are the  only  robust variables  found  in cross-country  studies  of 
unemployment.  Layard, Nickell,  and Jackman (1991), for example,  find 
that  countries  with  more  generous  UI benefits  tended  to  have  higher 
unemployment  rates in the 1980s. And,  unlike most of their explanatory 
variables,  the UI variable tends  to have  a similar effect in later years (see 
Forslund and Krueger, 1996). Several compelling  microeconometric  stud- 
ies  (some  involving  randomized  field  trials) have  also found  that more 
generous  UI benefits are associated  with longer spells of unemployment.4 
A few  comments  about  the  general  approach  taken in this paper  are 
also  called  for. First, it seems  to  me  that  the  piecemeal  aproach  (e.g., 
evaluate  minimum  wage,  then unions,  then UI) that the paper follows  is 
sensible  enough,  but what would  really be helpful  would  be to consider 
some  policies  in tandem.  Policies have interactions  that can either offset 
or exacerbate each others' distortions.  For example,  it is plausibly  argued 
that an effect of the Earned Income Tax Credit is to lower market wages, 
and the minimum  wage  can offset this distortionary  effect. The approach 
developed  in this paper could be used  to evaluate  the optimal combina- 
tion of policies  designed  to achieve  a certain aim (in this case, raising the 
welfare  of low-income  workers). 
Second,  it is unclear to me how the results from the elaborate simulation 
exercise in this paper differ from a more simple  (simple-minded?)  partial 
equilibrium analysis.  For example,  with the parameters chosen,  how  dif- 
ferent would  the predicted effects of a minimum wage or union wage floor 
be in a textbook partial-equilibrium  model? My guess  is that the predic- 
tions would  be quite similar, which  makes me wonder  whether  the addi- 
tional complexity  that the authors introduce  is worth the cost. 
Third,  and  perhaps  most  importantly,  it seems  to  me  that we  are a 
long  way  from being  in  a position  where  we  know  enough  about  the 
structure and operation  of the labor market to model  economic  behavior 
with the fully specified general-equilibrium  approach taken here. Person- 
ally, I think that the effort would  be better spent  identifying  natural and 
actual  experiments  that  yield  insight  into  the  modeling  assumptions 
required for this type of work (estimating parameter values,  understand- 
ing  employer  search behavior,  etc.)  than jumping  to a full-scale  model 
4. See,  for example,  Meyer (1995), Solon  (1985), and Katz and Meyer (1990). Discussion  *  315 
based  on  an unknown  set  of primitives.  But, as I noted  earlier, I think 
there  is benefit  from  diverse  research  methods,  and  it is reassuring  to 
know that the machinery is available for the type of analysis in this paper 
when  economics  is in a position  to model  the labor market more confi- 
dently  some  time in the next millennium. 
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complete  markets.  The  reason  for  the  similarity  in  results  is  that  the 
average  duration  of  unemployment  in the  United  States  is only  about 
three months.  The resulting  risk is sufficiently  small that it can be effec- 
tively handled  through  sef-insurance.  Veracierto concluded  that it is rea- 
sonable  to abstract from borrowing  constraints  and market incomplete- 
ness,  and  that  the  main  effects  of  policy  appear  to  operate  through 
search incentives  (for workers)  and hiring incentives  (for firms). 
Continuing  his  response,  Veracierto conceded  that undirected  search 
is a strong  assumption.  He  said,  however,  that experiments  by the au- 
thors  with  directed  search  in  the  context  of  unemployment  insurance 
actually strengthened  the results.  He also thought  that including  capital 
would  enhance  the effects that they find. Veracierto agreed with Krueger 
that their simulations  are not successful  in capturing  the cross-sectional 
wage  distribution,  a result of their assumption  of worker homogeneity. 
Robert Shimer disagreed  with the presumption  that workers can effec- 
tively  self-insure  against  unemployment,  since  even  though  spells  are 
short on average  they tend  to be repeated  and may lead to wage  losses. 
He expanded  on the criticism of complete  markets by noting  that several 
of  the  policies  analyzed,  such  as  unemployment  insurance  and  firing 
taxes,  make  little  sense  in  such  a world.  Effectively,  in  this  setup,  UI 
serves  only as a subsidy  for search. Several people  noted  that incorpora- 
tion of permanent  shocks,  such as aggregate productivity  shocks,  would 
increase the need  for insurance  by workers.  Mark Gertler suggested  that 
self-insurance  would  work  well  only  if  agents  were  very  long-lived, 
allowing  them  to  spread  the  effects  of shocks  out  over  many  periods. 
The authors replied  that such long lives  are necessary  only if the shocks 
are relatively persistent. 
Christopher  Foote agreed with  the authors that a general-equilibrium 
framework  is necessary  to think about firing taxes,  since  firing taxes re- 
duce aggregate productivity  and thus the return to work. He also pointed 
out that the welfare cost of firing taxes calculated here is very close to that 
found  by Hugo  Hopenhayn  and Richard Rogerson  in related work.  The 
authors noted  that their work differed from that of Hopenhayn  and Rog- 
erson mainly  in that the latter allowed  for entry and exit of firms. 
Ben  Bernanke  suggested  the  incorporation  into  the  model  of  two 
classes  of  workers  of  different  productivity,  or with  different  endow- 
ments  of labor supply, in order to allow for a more realistic spread in the 
wage  distribution.  He  thought  that the  analysis  of the minimum  wage 
would  be  particularly  interesting  in that  extension.  He  also  suggested 
supplementing  the  steady-state  analysis  with  analyses  of  one-time 
shocks  followed  by transition to the steady  state.  The authors indicated 
an interest in doing  future work that includes  worker heterogeneity. 